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MODERN PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES:
RECOGNIZING RIGHTS AND
INTEGRATING STANDARDS
Alexandra B. Klass*
INTRODUCTION

Throughout its existence, the public trust doctrine has been pulled in different directions and assigned different meanings. At its
core, the public trust doctrine is the idea that there are some resources, notably tidal and navigable waters and the lands under them
that are forever subject to state ownership and protection in trust for
the use and benefit of the public. To some, the doctrine is a vehicle
for public access to water, beaches, or fishing in a world otherwise
dominated by private ownership. To others it is a check on government attempts to give away or sell such resources for short-term economic gain. To yet others, it is a back-door mechanism for judicial
taking of private property without just compensation through a clever
argument that the property was never "private" in the first place. In
general, however, it has been lauded as a doctrine full of potential for
environmental and natural resources protection, but also has been
subject to significant criticism since its resurgence in its modern form
in the 1970s.
Criticisms of the modern public trust doctrine include that it is
an anachronistic, property-based doctrine that prevents a rethinking
of how humans relate to the world from a holistic or ecological per© 2006 Alexandra B. Klass. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Daniel A. Farber, Bradley C. Karkkainen, and J.B. Ruhl for valuable suggestions on

earlier versions of this Article. I also benefited greatly from comments received at
workshops at the University of Minnesota Law School and the Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington.
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spective;I that it places emphasis on the judiciary and the common law
rather than on more powerful and comprehensive legislative efforts to
protect the environment; 2 or that it is a doctrine devoid of standards
that encourages judicial takings of private property without just cornpensation. - As William Rodgers stated in the 1980s, ten years after the
modern doctrine burst on the scene, "It is a doctrine with both a radical potential and indifferent prospects. ' 4 Regardless of its alleged
problems and limitations, this historic and amorphous doctrine continues to be studied by students and scholars of property law, constitutional law, environmental law, natural resources law, and public lands
law.
The purpose of this Article is to create a new theoretical framework for a modern public trust doctrine grounded in state common
law that can be used broadly for environmental protection purposes
and is responsive to the various criticisms of the doctrine set out
above. Most scholarly treatment of the public trust doctrine has explored the doctrine only in its common law form, or in its manifesta1 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's
Public Trust Theory of EnvironsnentalProtection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of
Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1212-18 (1991) (arguing that the public trust
doctrine is a wrong or flawed solution to the nation's environmental crisis and has
impaired the development of more ambitious reform movements).
2 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
NaturalResources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 656-715
(1986) (arguing that by being based on a private property rights conception of natural resources law, the public trust doctrine is an anachronism which impedes more
progressive legislative developments to protect natural resources and the
environment).
3 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVrL. L. 527, 565-68 (1989) (arguing that the public
trust doctrine is an unworkable doctrine and is incompatible with the values of a
constitutional democracy); George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust
Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. Arr. L. REV.
307, 322-41 (2006) (arguing that expansion of the public trust doctrine to protect

modern environmental protection needs not grounded in natural law traditions
would unreasonably interfere with private property rights and result in improper judicial activism); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REv. 1449 (1990)
(arguing that judicial changes in the law impacting private property rights should not
be immune from a takings analysis); see also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S.
1207, 1212 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia dissented from the Court's
denial of certiorari in this Oregon case denying development rights to owners of certain dry sand beaches because of the public's interest in those beaches. He argued
that "[nijo more by judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a State transform private property into public property without compensation." Id.
4 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS,JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2.20, at 155
(1986).
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influential law review article on the topic in 1970.5 This Part looks not
only at the doctrine's modern common law scope, but how the doctrine has been integrated into many states' constitutions and statutory
law beginning in the 1970s. Part II reviews recent case law that has
made efforts to integrate developments in the common law public
trust doctrine, state and federal statutes, and state constitutions in order to support decisions protecting natural resources where any one
of those legal doctrines on their own might be insufficient. Part III
explains the significance of these judicial developments in today's
world and presents a framework grounded in state law to expand and
strengthen this holistic and mutually reinforcing public trust approach to protect and preserve natural resources and the
environment.
I.

HISTORIC ORIGINS AND MODERN CONCEPTIONS

The common law public trust doctrine is often described as elusive or vague as a result of its ancient and diffuse origins and variations in scope among the states. 6 Briefly though, the idea behind the
public trust doctrine is that while private ownership of land and resources dominates American property law, there are some resources,
notably navigable and tidal waters and the lands under them that are
forever subject to state ownership and protection in trust for the use
and benefit of the public. 7 Although the origins of the doctrine may
be in some dispute, most scholars trace it back to Roman and English
law, which held that property rights in the rivers, seas and seashore
were to be preserved for the benefit of the public for navigation, fishing or other purposes. 8 In other words, unlike other types of public
property, such lands could never be granted or sold into private
ownership .9
5 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
6 See RODGERS, supra note 4, § 2.20, at 155-56 (stating that the public trust doctrine is "resoundingly vague, obscure in origin and uncertain of purpose" and that "its
theoretical underpinnings have not been adequately clarified"); Carol M. Rose, Joseph
Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 EcOLOGY L.Q. 351, 355-56 (1998) (stating that
although the "general concept" of the public trust was "widely cited" in cases and
scholarship, "the doctrine itself remained vague").
7 RODGFRS, supra note 4, § 2.20, at 158-59; Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois
Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800 (2004).
8 See, e.g., Lazarus supra note 2, at 633-35.
9 SeeJOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 163-65 (Alfred A. Knopf ed.,
1970) (discussing origins of American public trust doctrine in Roman and English
law); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 633-35; Sax, supra note 5, at 475-76. In Justinian's
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As applied in the United States, the Supreme Court held in the
1840s that the original colonies succeeded to the English crown the
ownership of submerged lands under tidal waters and that after independence, the newly formed state governments held tide to such
lands.' The Court also held that states later admitted to the Union
obtained the same ownership rights to submerged lands under tidal
waters as the original thirteen states under the "equal footing"
doctrine .1
With this significant ownership granted to states came limitations
as well. First, under the Commerce Clause, Congress had express authority to regulate those navigable waterways subject to state ownership and exercise a "navigational servitude" over such waters without
paying compensation.12 Second, and more significantly, the Supreme
Court confirmed in 1892 in the significant case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,13 that the historic public trust doctrine was an independent limitation on the state's power to sell or otherwise relinquish
control over submerged lands that instead must always be held "in
14
trust" for the public.
Illinois Central involved state legislation in 1869 which granted to
the Illinois Central Railroad more than 1000 acres along the shores of
Lake Michigan in the Chicago Harbor, extending for a mile out from
compendium of Roman law, he declared as part of natural law that there were communal rights in the air, running water, the sea and the shores of the sea. See Lazarus,
supra note 2, at 633-34.
10 See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,416-17 (1842); Kearney& Merrill,
supra note 7, at 828.
11 See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845) (holding that the statehood clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1, required that
new states enter the Union on grounds of full political equality with the other states);
see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 823-33 (discussing history of state ownership of lands under tidal and navigable-in-fact waters); Charles F. Wilkinson, The
Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Scope and Source of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 443-47 (1989) (discussing the "equal footing" doctrine and

its origins).
12 See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 124 (1967); United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 227 (1956); Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 449-50 (citing
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913)) (denying
compensation for lost power-generating value of hydroelectric site taken under condemnation by Congress); see also Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897)
(finding that although the state holds title to navigable waters and lands underlying
them, such title is subject to a federal navigational servitude for the purpose of regulating and improving navigation); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64 n.7 (Mich.
2005) (same).
13
14

146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id. at 452.
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the coast and for a mile in length across the city's central business
district.' 5 A few years later, the state had a change of heart, revoked
the earlier grant, and brought a lawsuit to have the original grant declared invalid. The Supreme Court upheld the state's claim on
grounds that the original grant of submerged lands was invalid under
the public trust doctrine.' 6
The Court confirmed that the state held title to the submerged
lands in Lake Michigan,1 7 but also held that the title was "different in
character" from other state lands which could be sold into private
ownership."' Although the Court acknowledged that it could not cite
any authority where a grant like this had been held invalid, it stated
that there were numerous decisions stating that such property is held
by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public. As a
result, the state's control of such lands, for purposes of the trust, "can
never be lost," unless conveyed for uses promoting the interest of the
public.1 9 The Court went on to recognize that the Chicago Harbor
was of significant value to the people of Illinois, and was to be held in
trust for them so they could enjoy navigation, carry on commerce and
enjoy the liberty of fishing free from obstruction or interference by
private parties.

20

The Court was not at all clear regarding the legal basis for this
restriction on state power and subsequent Court opinions have not
provided additional clarity.2 1 Some scholars have proposed that the
public trust doctrine is a product of congressional preemption resulting from a comprehensive program to keep the major watercourses
free for navigation, or constitutionally founded in the Commerce
Clause. 22 Others have argued it may be grounded in the Due Process
15 Id. at 433-44, 54; SAx, supra note 9, at 170-71.
16 Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 454. For a detailed history of the facts of the Illinois
Central case, see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7.
17 The Court held expressly that the submerged lands to which the state automatically held title were not limited to tidelands but also include the Great Lakes and
other major inland waterbodies. Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 435-37.
18 Id. at 452.
19 Id. at 453.
20 Id. at 452, 454.
21 See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 803, 928-29 (referring to ambiguities in the Illinois Centralopinion on the source of the public trust doctrine in state or
federal law).
22 See Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 445-46. Wilkinson also raised the possibility
that the doctrine could be based either on federal common law or the Guarantee
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, but rejected those possibilities on grounds that it was
unlikely a modern court would employ either basis to support the doctrine. Id.
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or Equal Protection Clauses. 23 The Court in Illinois Central was also
elusive as to whether state law or federal law defined the scope of the
trust and whether it was in any way based on federal common law.
Indeed, it was perhaps less crucial that the Court define the precise
basis for its holding because the case predated its 1938 decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, where the Court held that " [t here is no federal general common law." 24 Illinois Centralcertainly implies that fed-

eral law governs in the sense that that Illinois or any other state
cannot override trust obligations by statute. 25 However, in 1988, in
PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Mississippi,2 6 the Supreme Court held that each
state could decide how broadly it wished to define its trust lands, even
in the face of competing private property interests. 27 Significantly, no
state court has attempted to do away entirely with the public trust doctrine within its borders, the Supreme Court has never indicated that a
state would have a right to do so, 2 8 and at least one state court has
invalidated legislative attempts to do so. 2 9 Thus, one can consider the
doctrine as containing a federal prohibition on any state efforts to
abrogate the doctrine entirely, but allowing states a wide berth to expand the doctrine's protection beyond a federal minimum.3 0
Putting aside its legal groundings, Illinois Central stands as an
early invocation of the public trust doctrine to prevent a state from
placing public trust lands into private hands for short-term economic
gain to the detriment of the long-term preservation of the resource
for the public. As Joseph Sax detailed in his groundbreaking 1970 law
review article,3 1 courts in several states prior to 1970 had relied on
some version of public trust principles to prevent states from compromising public trust resources in the name of economic development
or to benefit private interests. 32 Based on this authority, Sax argued
23 See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO. J. 411, 426-28 (1987).
24 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
25 See Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 453, 455 (making broad references to "the State"
and that "[a]ny grant of the kind is necessarily revocable"); Wilkinson, supra note 11,
at 460.
26 484 U.S. 469 (1988).

27

Id. at 475-76, 482-83.

28 See Wilkinson; supra note 11, at 463-64.
29 See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999)
(holding as a matter of state constitutional law that a state cannot abrogate the public
trust doctrine by statute); infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
30 Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 464.
31 See Sax, supra note 5.
32 See id. at 491-546 (citing, e.g., Robbins v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577,
578-580 (Mass. 1969) (invalidating statute authorizing transfer of wetlands "of considerable beauty" that were "often used for nature study and recreation" to public works

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

82:2

that the public trust doctrine as implemented by the judiciary had the
potential to become a powerful mechanism to protect the public interest in access, navigation, and recreation against state action that
would attempt to privatize or limit those resources.3 3 In doing so, Sax
summarized the doctrine as applying where there was a legal right
vested in the public, the right was enforceable against the government, and the substance of the right was harmonious with environ34
mental concerns.
More importantly, Sax argued that although the doctrine had historically been limited to lands underlying navigable waters and situations involving state action that would convey or destroy those lands,
"the judicial techniques developed in public trust cases need not be
limited either to these few conventional interests or to questions of
disposition of public properties."35 Instead, Sax posited that the mixture of procedural and substantive protection applied in traditional
public trust cases would be equally applicable in cases involving air
pollution, pesticides, strip mining, utility rights of way, or wetland fill36
ing on private land that requires a permit.

Sax's article became a significant force that converged with other
political and social developments in the 1960s and early 1970s to establish the modern field of environmental law and completely transform how the government and the public responded to issues of
natural resources, conservation, environmental protection and economic development.3 7 Moreover, since 1970, court decisions have redepartment for highway development); Sacco v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 227 N.E.2d 478,
480-81 (Mass. 1967) (invalidating legislation authorizing filling of pond for highway
construction); Gould v. Greylock, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966) (invalidating state
lease and management agreement issued to private party to create commercial development on 4,000 acres in public park); In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist.
No. 1, 196 N.W. 874, 877-78 (Wis. 1924) (invalidating action to drain wetlands); In re
Trempeleau Drainage Dist., 131 N.W. 838, 841-42 (Wis. 1911) (invalidating state action taken to drain swamplands); Priewe v. Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 67
N.W. 918, 922 (Wis. 1896) (invalidating legislation authorizing a private individual to
drain a lake)).
33 Sax, supra note 5, at 475.
34 See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 642 (summarizing Sax's views of the doctrine);
Sax, supra note 5, at 491-531.
35 Sax, supra note 5, at 556.
36 Id. at 557. Sax discussed many of these issues in more detail in his book Defending the Environment, also published in 1970. See SAX, supra note 9.
37 See Delgado, supra note 1, at 1210. Delgado suggests that the time was "exactly
right" for Sax's article in light of the growing environmental movement and efforts of
scholars, activists and ordinary citizens calling "for greater attention to the problems
of decreasing quality of life, increasing pollution, and overdevelopment of the nation's farm and wilderness lands." Id.; see also Peter Manus, To the Candidate in Search
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flected a growing awareness of environmental issues in developing the
public trust doctrine as a matter of common law, while state legislatures have acted in kind by adopting state environmental protection
provisions in their state constitutions and statutes often based expressly on public trust principles. A brief review of this common law,
constitutional and statutory history follows. This review sets the stage
for the analysis in Parts II and III, which creates a framework to integrate the developments in each of these areas.
A.

Common Law Developments

Since Sax's article in 1970, courts have decided hundreds of cases
involving the public trust doctrine and cited Sax's article in many of
them. 3

8

These cases include not only private parties suing the govern-

ment for allegedly breaching public trust duties (the most common
situation in cases prior to 1970), but also private parties suing other
private parties and the government suing private parties. 39 Not only
have the types of actions under the doctrine expanded but the reach
of the doctrine itself has expanded.
In certain states, courts have expanded the doctrine from its historic domain of ensuring public access to navigable waters to protecting use, access to, and preservation of all waters usable for
of a Theme: Promote the Public Trust, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 331 (2000) ("Sax articulated his public trust thesis at a moment in history-perhaps the only moment in
modern American history-when it appeared that the country's political and legal
institutions might fully embrace environmental values."); Rose, supra note 6, at
353-54 (placing Sax's article in the context of the beginning of modem environmentalism); see also ZvGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
1065-66, 1068 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the impact of modem public trust doctrine
on statutory protection of endangered species, air quality, water quality, as well as all
settings where human actors threaten to destroy public trust resources, the state attempts to sell public trust resources, or governments attempt to exploit public trust
resources); Delgado, supra note 1, at 1213 (recognizing Sax's influence on federal
environmental statutes); Manus, supra, at 331 (same).
38 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 37, at 1073 (stating that Sax's article has been
cited extensively and can claim the majority of credit for the active presence of the
public trust doctrine in U.S. environmental law); Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie,
Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses,
29 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 321, 341-42 & n.125 (2005) (noting that Sax's article had
been cited in at least thirty-three judicial opinions by 1989 and in six additional opinions by 2005); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 644 (stating that between 1970 and 1985, in
half of the states, approximately 100 cases were reported involving the public trust
doctrine, many of which cite Sax's article).
39 See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 645-46 & n.79 (collecting cases).
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recreational purposes,4 0 the dry sand area of beaches for public recreation purposes, 41 parklands, 42 wildlife and wildlife habitat connected
to navigable waters, 43 drinking water resources, 44 and inland wetlands. 45 Courts have also used the doctrine to resolve water appropriation issues and have held that even preexisting water rights may be
curtailed if necessary to prevent reduction of water in inland streams
or lakes that provide aesthetic values or habitats for animal and plant
46
species or other natural resources.
These more recent public trust decisions show how the environmental movement of the 1970s began to influence state courts' conceptions of the role of the common law public trust doctrine in our
modern world. Indeed, the supreme courts of California, Wisconsin
and Illinois and lower courts in other jurisdictions issued strong public trust opinions in the 1970s that expressly recognized society's growing concern regarding environmental issues and the need for
common law legal doctrines to evolve to meet those needs.
For instance, in 1972 in Just v. Marinette County,47 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that a shoreland zoning ordinance prohibiting
40 See Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984)
(extending public trust doctrine to all waters capable of recreational use by the
public).
41 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 363-66 (N.J.
1984) (explaining that the public trust doctrine requires public access to dry sand
beaches between high water mark and vegetation line in both public or quasi-public
ownership).
42 See Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15 (I1. 1970) (stating that
the public trust applies to parkland); Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. New York, 750
N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that the common law public trust doctrine in
New York extends to parkland and such land cannot be alienated without express
legislative authorization).
43 See Pullen v. Ullmer, 923 P.2d 54, 61 (Alaska 1996) (holding that the doctrine
applies to salmon and other fish); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)
(holding that trust purposes are broader than traditional uses of navigation, commerce and fishing and include use as open space, for wildlife habitat, scientific study
and swimming).
44 Mayor v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1987) (stating that the public trust doctrine applies to drinking water resources).
45 SeeJust v. Mainette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1972); Lazarus, supra
note 2, at 649-50.
46 See, e.g., CWC Fisheries v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1121 (Alaska 1988); Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727-28 (Cal. 1983); In reWai'ola 0
Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 710 (Haw. 2004); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450
(Idaho 1985); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976); Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 465-66 (discussing
court decisions since 1970 extending the doctrine beyond its historic origins).
47 201 N.W.2d 761.
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the
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Id. at 772.
Id. at 767.

50
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Id. at 768.
!d.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 771.

48

359 N.Y.S.2d 848
Ct. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
54 336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (N.Y. Dist.
(N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
55 Id. at 775.
56 Id.
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Likewise, in 1971, the California Supreme Court held in Marks v.
Whitney,5 7 that a private owner of tidelands did not have the right to

fill the tidelands as a result of the public trust doctrine. The court
noted that the matter was of great importance because of population
pressures, demands for recreational property, and the increasing development of seashore and waterfront property, 5 The court stated
that although the public trust doctrine historically was defined in
terms of navigation, commerce and fisheries, the doctrine was "sufficiently flexible" to encompass changing public needs.5 9 The court
went on to note that there was a growing recognition that one of the
most important uses of tidelands is preservation of those lands in their
natural state, to serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open
space, and to support environments which provide food and habitat
60
for birds and marine life.
Finally, in 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Scott v. Chicago Park District,61 that a state senate bill conveying nearly 200 acres
under Lake Michigan to a steel company was void under the public
trust doctrine. The court recognized that the industrial plant to be
built would create public benefits in the form ofjobs and an improved
economy, but that the state could not satisfy its public trust doctrine
obligations through such economic benefits. 62 As a counterweight to
the economic public benefit, the court focused on the fact that Lake
Michigan is a valuable natural resource that belongs to the people of
the state, and that "there has developed a strong, though belated interest in conserving natural resources and in protecting and improv63
ing our physical environment."
These cases from the 1970s show at least some state courts recognizing the nation's awakening to environmental issues and incorporating those principles into public trust decisions in a major way. This
phenomenon did not end with the 1970s.6 4 In 1983, the California

Supreme Court in the famous "Mono Lake" case held that the public
trust doctrine applied to inland, navigable lakes and required the state
to take into account ecological and aesthetic interests in making water
allocation decisions even where state statutes did not appear to allow
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

491 P.2d 374, 378 (Cal. 1971).
Id. at 378.
Id. at 380.
Id.
360 N.E.2d 773 (111. 1977).
id. at 781.
Id. at 780.
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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consideration of such concerns. 6 5 In reaching its holding, the court
stated that Mono Lake was "a scenic and ecological treasure of national significance, imperiled by continued diversion of water," and
that the state's public trust values required those concerns to be integrated into the state's water appropriation scheme. 66 The court's decision detailed the lake's steadily increasing salinity which would
adversely impact the food chain, millions of local and migratory birds
using the lake, and the lake's value as an aesthetic, recreational and
scientific resource.

67

In 1998, the New York Supreme Court held that a state law restricting development in a natural area of Long Island was not an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation. 6
The court began its discussion in a manner nearly identical to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Just, by stating that the case
was "a clash between two dynamic impulses, the collective right to preserve natural resources and the individual right of property." 69 In
holding that the public trust doctrine limited the plaintiff's property
rights so as to render the law not a taking, the court provided a history
of the public trust doctrine and argued that the early common law in
England and America spoke to the subject of environmental regulation, and provided a common law custom that supported the law in
question. 70 In response to the plaintiffs' contention that development
would not result in environmental harm, the court looked back all the
way to Roman law for the proposition that the "conservation of resources is intrinsically good and necessary for the continuation of society." 71 Thus, the court concluded that in enacting environmental
laws, the government was simply meeting its obligation to preserve
resources for future generations.7 2
In 2004, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly recognized environmental protection values in finding that a diversion project that
65
66

Id. at 727-28.
Id. at 712.

67 Id. at 715-16.
68 W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
69 Id. at 1007.
70 Id. at 1009.
71 Id. at 1012; see also Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1045-47 (111.
1999) (Harrison J., dissenting). In Glisson, the dissent argued for citizen standing to
challenge a dam on a creek that would impact endangered species, focusing on the
"well-documented importance of biodiversity to human welfare," and concluded that
"[wle protect threatened and endangered species because, in doing so, we protect
ourselves and the welfare of Illinoisans who will inherit this land when we are gone."
Id. at 1046.
72 WJF Realty, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 1011-12.
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beds was not a taking based in
would impact private interests in oyster
73 The court stated that
part on the common law public trust doctrine.
"fits precisely within the public
the implementation of the project
at issue "is our very coasttrust doctrine" because the public resource
'74
The court
at an alarming rate.
line, the loss of which is occurring
environthreat to the resource as "not just

went on to describe the
and welfare of the people as
mental" but also the health, safety,
barrier between large populacoastal erosion removes an important
75 The court warned that left untions and hurricanes and storms.
in the loss of land, jobs and
checked this erosion would result
on the coastal region for transcorridors critical to businesses that rely
oyster
76 Thus the court held that the interference with
portation.
trust doctrine to address erobeds must be allowed under the public
later born out by
77
The court's fears, of course, were
sion concers.
in 2005.78
Katrina
from Hurricane
the massive disaster resulting
examples of state courts
These cases provide only a few recent
their discussions of the comincorporating environmental values into
of state law, and using the docmon law public doctrine as a matter
resources are protected and
trine to ensure that public trust
that at least some courts have
preserved. However, despite the fact
environmental values into the
been able to incorporate contemporary
the critics are correct that the comcommon law public trust doctrine,
First, very few, if any,
mon law doctrine on its own remains limited. beyond tidal or navidoctrine
courts have extended the common law
inland resources that are ungable waters, thus leaving unprotected79
rivers.
or
connected to navigable lakes
1101-02, 1109-10 (La. 2004).
73 Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085,
74 Id. at 1101.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1101-02.
868, 875-76
New Hanover County, 619 S.E.2d
77 Id. at 1102; see also Parker v.
project was
special assessment for inlet relocation
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
the impornoting
and
on the public trust doctrine
not unconstitutional based in part
to recent
related
concerns
the
areas and
tance of North Carolina's coastal
hurricanes).
L.J. 1 (2006)
Save New Orleans?,19 TUL. ENvTrL.
78 See, e.g., Oliver Houck, Can We
chalphysical
the
of
and erosion as part
(discussing impact of historic development
Katrina's
al.,
et
Manard
P.
John
Katrina);
lenges facing New Orleans after Hurricane
36 (2006)
RESOURCRS & ENV'T 31, 31-32,
NAT.
20
Storm,
Imperfect
Tort Litigation: An
of
destruction
of natural barriers in Louisiana and
(discussing artificial modifications
for development).
protective marshland and wetlands
"for the time
4, § 2.20, at 158-60 (stating that
note
79 See, e.g., RODGERS, supra
lands, the
submerged
to
restlessly"
confined
being, the public trust doctrine remains
foreshore and other navigable waters).
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More important, relying exclusively on the common law as the
primary mechanism to protect natural resources and the environment
(whether in the form of the public trust doctrine or in the form of
more familiar doctrines such as nuisance or negligence) has always
had limitations which still exist today. As a general matter, the common law tends to operate retrospectively rather than prospectively; it
is sporadic and case-specific; it develops slowly in multiple jurisdictions, making a national and more immediate solution to a problem
nearly impossible; it must abide by common law burdens of proof and
is administered by judges who often lack specialized or scientific expertise in the area.80 These limitations of common law generally are
exacerbated in the public trust area where, unlike doctrines of nuisance or negligence that exist in virtually every state jurisdiction, the
public trust doctrine is hardly recognized or used in many jurisdictions. For instance, the common law doctrine has never been used for
environmental protection purposes in Minnesota, a state otherwise
historically known for its progressive environmental protection
policies.8'
As a result, the common law public trust doctrine is clearly nowhere near a global solution to advancing protection for natural resources and the environment, whether threatened by state action or
private action. However, the public trust doctrine can still play an important role in ensuring judicial review of actions that threaten natural resources and the environment where an environmental statute
does not apply or is not being enforced, or where state constitutional
provisions to protect natural resources do not exist or are ineffective.
In the cases described in this subpart, the public trust doctrine was
often available as a last resort for judicial review where there was simply no other statutory law, constitutional law or common law available
for relief. Thus, to the extent the common law public trust doctrine
can provide support to or be supported by environmental policies in

80 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 37, at 283-84.
81 A Westlaw search of "public trust doctrine" in Minnesota gives a result of only
one case applying the doctrine under Minnesota law, and in that case, the court
found that the doctrine applied only to navigable waterways and did not extend to
state parkland. Larson v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding
that the public trust doctrine did not prevent department of natural resources from
selling state land that had been designated as a wildlife management area to a private
party). As noted below, while Minnesota courts have rarely discussed the common
law public trust doctrine, they have interpreted expansively the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, MLNN. STAT. §§ 1161.01-.13 (2004), which is based on public trust
principles.
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82 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of
247
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Future of Montana'sEnvironmental Provisions,
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Impacts Using State Courts and Constitutions,
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COLUM. J. ENVTrL. L. 135, 167 (2005).
(providing examples of states falling into
85 Thompson, supra note 83, at 160-61
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Not surprisingly, the most powerful state constitutional provisions
were enacted in the 1970s at the height of the environmental movement. 6 For instance, article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, approved in 1971 states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common
property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth 8shall
conserve and
7
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Similarly, Montana's Constitution, approved in 1974, provides an
"inalienable" right to a "clean and healthful environment" and creates
a duty upon both the state and private persons to "maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and
future generations."8 8 The same provision goes on to require that the
legislature provide for the administration and enforcement of this
duty and provide adequate remedies "for the protection of the environmental life support system from degredation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degredation
of natural resources." 89
Both the Pennsylvania and Montana constitutions thus not only
codify certain public trust principles regarding the state's obligation
to preserve natural resources for present and future generations, but
also go one step further and provide a right of action for citizens or
the state to enforce those rights. 90 Moreover, unlike the common law
combination of the concepts undergirding the public trust doctrine: conservation,
public access and trusteeship.").
86 See, e.g., Kirsch, supranote 85, at 1169 (stating that just after this country's first
"Earth Day," many states began the process of attempting to amend their state constitutions to "reflect a new premium on environmental protection").
87 PA. CoNsT. art I, § 27.
88 MONT, CONST. art. II, § 3; id. art. IX, § 1.
89 Id. art. IX, § 1.
90 Other states which incorporate strong public trust and environmental protection provisions include Alaska, Hawaii, and Louisiana. SeeALAsKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3
("Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to
the people for common use,"); HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("For the benefit of present
and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these
resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the
self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the state
for the benefit of the people."); LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("The natural resources of the
state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic and esthetic quality
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public trust doctrine which applies in most states only to navigable
waters and trust resources dependent on navigable waters (such as fish
or migratory birds), these state constitutional provisions extend protection to a much broader array of resources and species.
While provisions like those in the Pennsylvania and Montana constitutions would appear on their face to provide the solution to the
limitations of the common law public trust doctrine, appearances can
be deceiving. For instance, the Montana courts have interpreted the
constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment quite
broadly to allow a range of actions based on the provision. In 1999, in
Montana EnvironmentalInformation Center (MEIC) v. Department of Environmental Quality,9 1 the Montana Supreme Court held that the state's
right to a clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny and is not limited to health-based standards. In
that case, the court held a nonprofit group could sue the state environmental agency and a mining company to prevent discharge of contaminants to a river that would adversely impact water quality and
92
species even though the agency's rules allowed such a discharge.
In reaching its decision, the court found that the amendment's
intention was not to create a health-based standard but to permit no
degradation from the present environment and affirmatively require
enhancement of that environment. 93 The court also implicitly found
that the right to a clean and healthful environment was "self-executing" meaning that it was not dependent on or limited to legislative
action or violation of regulatory standards 4 Two years later, in 2001,
the Montana Supreme Court recognized that the right to a clean and
healthful environment imposed requirements not only on state action, but also private action, when it held that the provision required
rescission of a private contract for a well installation that would result
in groundwater contamination.9"
of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible
and consistent with the health, safety and welfare of the people.").
91 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
92 Id. at 1249.
93 Id. at 1247 (quoting from delegate statement at constitutional convention).
94 Id. The environmental provisions in the Illinois, Hawaii, and New York constitutions are explicitly self-executing. Courts have reached varying decisions on
whether other state environmental provisions are self-executing where the provision
itself is silent. See, e.g., Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Va. 1985)
(holding that environmental protection provision in Virginia Constitution is not selfexecuting); Klee, supra note 84, at 175-78 (discussing issue of self-execution in various state constitutions).
95 Cape-Francis Enters. v. Peed, 29 P.3d 1011, 1017 (Mont. 2001).
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However, in contrast to the expansive interpretation Montana
courts have given their constitutional environmental provisions,
courts in other states have not generally followed suit. Illinois has a
constitutional provision enacted in 1970 which states that "Itihe public policy of the state and the duty of each person is to provide and
maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future
generations." 6 In 1999, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted this
provision to allow a private party standing to seek to enjoin construction of a dam on a creek that allegedly would impact state endangered
species. 97 However, the court dismissed the complaint on grounds
that the constitutional provision was to protect public health, which
does not include protection of species. 8 Although the decision was
subject to a strong dissent citing the growing knowledge of the interrelatedness between the human condition and plant and animal species, 9 9 the case means that the Illinois Constitution likely cannot be
used in situations where the plaintiff cannot prove the action or inaction will directly affect human health, as opposed to the environment
generally.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not given much
teeth to the aspirational language contained in section 27 of its constitution quoted earlier in this Article. Although Pennsylvania courts
have held that section 27 is self-executing, they have also held expressly that in evaluating development projects, the constitution does
not require consideration of any environmental factors not already
required by statute. 10 1 As a result, despite its broad language, section
96 ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
97 Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1045 (Ill. 1999).
98 Id. at 1034.
99 Id. at 1046 (HarrisonJ, dissenting) ("We protect threatened and endangered
species because, in doing so, we protect ourselves and the welfare of Illinoisans who
will inherit this land when we are gone.... To suggest, as my colleagues do, that the
only environmental threats implicated by our Constitution are those that emanate
from a smoke stack, drain pipe or car exhaust ignores wisdom, science and the plain
language of the law.").
100 See Borough of Moosic v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 429 A.2d 1237, 1240 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1981) (holding that section 27 does not require considering factors beyond those in existing statutes when assessing actions harmful to the environment);
Cmty. Coll. of Del. County v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 480-82 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)
(same); see also Snelling v. Dep't of Transp., 366 A.2d 1298, 1305 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1976) ("Section 27 does not require consideration of factors beyond those which, by
statute, must be considered in evaluating projects which are potentially harmful to the
environment."); Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d
886, 892 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), affd, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) ("We find no more
reason to hold that Section 27 needs legislative definition than that the peoples' [sic]
freedoms of religion and speech should wait upon the pleasure of the General Assem-
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27 on its own provides no substantive check on actions that may harm
the environment.' 0 '
Even in those states with more directive environmental rights language, such as Montana, state supreme courts in only four of the eight
states with such language in their constitutions have addressed the nature of these rights (Montana, Illinois, Louisiana and Hawaii) and
many other courts have found that their provisions are not self-executing.10 2 As a result, there are very few cases where state courts have
held on the merits that a state constitutional provision provides singular authority to prevent or require state or private action and most
commentators have concluded that the provisions are largely ineffective in most states. 10 3 This ineffectiveness has been attributed to various factors, including state court decisions holding that the provisions
are not self-executing and the rise of federal and state environmental
statutes beginning in the 1970s which have provided easier vehicles to
pursue environmental rights than the general provisions in state constitutions.1 4 Commentators have also criticized the use of such constitutional provisions to drive environmental policy, arguing that they
should not be a substitute for the direct legislative process,10 5 result in
cluttered state constitutions 1 6 and inappropriately inject complicated
bly."); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) ("Section 27. .. is a
self-executing provision in accordance with doctrines of public trust and represents a
proper exercise of state powers within the scope of the Ninth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.").
101 See Kirsch, supra note 85, at 1200-02 (describing Pennsylvania courts' interpretation of section 27 and concluding that courts "have undermined the intent of Pennsylvanians who adopted the state constitution's environmental protection provision");
see also Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 596,
599 (Pa. 1973) (Jones, C.J., dissenting) ("This Court has been given the opportunity
to affirm the mandate of the public empowering the Commonwealth to prevent environmental abuses; instead, the Court has chosen to emasculate a constitutional
amendment by declaring it not to be self-executing.... In one swift stroke the Court
has disemboweled a constitutional provision which seems, by unequivocal language,
to establish environmental control by public trust and, in so doing consequently sanctions the desecration of a unique national monument.")
102 See Klee, supra note 84, at 175-78.
103 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 83, at 158 (arguing that state constitution environmental provisions "have had little consequence in most of the states that have
adopted them"); Thompson, supra note 85, at 865 (finding that "courts have seldom
invoked substantial environmental [constitutional] provisions to constrain or dictate
state policy"); Kirsch, supra note 85, at 1171 (stating that "commentators have almost
universally lamented the ineffectiveness" of state constitution environmental
provisions).
104 See Thompson, supra note 83.
105 See id. at 196-97.
106 Id. at 160-65.
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mental statutes and the agencies to implement them through regulation and enforcement. 10 9 These developments at the federal level led
to a similar explosion of laws, regulations and agencies at the state
level, as the states began to implement federal mandates through the
concept of "cooperative federalism." ' 10 These new federal and state
statutes in the 1970s and 1980s thus set legislative policy and created
enforcement mechanisms on a national and state level in areas of air
pollution, water pollution, pesticides, toxic substances, soil and
groundwater contamination and remediation techniques."1 ' These
federal and state environmental protection statutes form the basis of
the environmental regulatory state that exists today. Many of these
statutes, particularly the National Environmental Policy Act,' 12 the
Clean Water Act,' 13 and the Endangered Species Act, 1 4 are based on
public trust principles in the sense that they set out a policy of protecting and preserving the environment for its own sake and for future
15
generations.'
In addition to these federal and state environmental protection
statutes, however, there also exists a different type of environmental
statute based expressly on public trust principles, described here as
state "environmental rights" statutes. Once again, Sax is responsible
109

See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 91 (5th

ed. 2006)

(describing the time period from 1970 to 1980 as containing an "explosion" of federal
legislation and creating an era of "federal regulatory infrastructure"); id. at 91-92
(providing a chronology of significant federal environmental legislation between
1970 and 1980, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act),
the 1972 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, the Endangered Species Act,
the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Toxic Substantives Control Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act); Ruhl, supranote 82, at 247 ("By the mid-1970s, however,
the command-and-control regime of federal environmental protection legislation had
evolved with unprecedented speed into a juggernaut of the administrative state.").
110

See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 109, at 103-04 (stating that the predominant

approach to federal-state relations under the environmental statutes today is "cooperative federalism" where federal agencies establish national environmental standards
and states may opt to assume responsibility for administering them).
111 See, e.g., id. at 91-98 (describing federal environmental laws setting policy directives and a comprehensive regulatory framework); Richard Revesz, Federalism and
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REv. 553, 626-30
(2001) (describing increased expertise and competence in the environmental area at
the state level).
112 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
113 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
114 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
115 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 1, at 1213 (recognizing Sax's influence on federal
environmental statutes); Manus, supra note 37, at 331 (same).
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for this development and his vision for incorporating public trust
principles into statutory law now becomes the third of three public
trust forms discussed in this Article.
In 1970, the same year as his famous article on the public trust
doctrine, Sax also published a book titled Defending the Environment, in
which he set out in more detail the potential for the public trust doctrine as well as other mechanisms for judicial review of actions that
may harm the environment. 116 He ended the book with a discussion
of a "model law" that, at the book's publication, had just come into
existence in the state of Michigan. Sax assisted in drafting this law,
known as the Michigan Environmental Policy Act (MEPA),1 7 which
Sax stated had three purposes. He described these purposes as recognizing the public right to a decent environment as an enforceable legal right; making it enforceable by private citizens suing as members
of the public; and setting the stage for the development of a common
law of environmental quality. 118 As to the third consideration, Sax
stated that the bill purposefully did not define pollution, environmental quality or the public trust in order to allow the courts to develop a
common law approach to environmental problems. In this way courts
would have the ability to address problems as they were identified and
formulate a flexible solution for the occasion. 1 19
These state statutes providing for citizen standing to protect the
environment and more aggressive judicial review of state and private
action have, just like state constitutional environmental provisions,
met with mixed results. For instance, the Minnesota legislature enacted the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA) 2 0 in 1971
and substantially modeled it after Michigan's law. I2 1 MERA gives any
natural person, corporation, state agency or municipality the right to
bring a civil action in district court for declaratory or equitable relief
against any person "for the protection of the air, water, land, or other
natural resources" within the state, whether publicly or privately
owned, "from pollution, impairment or destruction." 2 2 "Natural reSee SAX, supra note 9, at 149-92.
§§ 324.1701-.1706 (West 2005).
118 SAx, supra note 9, at 248.
119 Id.
120 MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (2004).
121 See State ex rel. Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 30
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that MERA was modeled after Michigan's Environmental Protection Act and adopting Michigan courts' four-factor test to determine
whether an action's effect on natural resources is sufficient to justify judicial
intervention),
122 See MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 (right of civil action); id, § 116B.02 (definitions).
116
117

MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
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sources" include, but are not limited to "all mineral, animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical
resources" as well as scenic and esthetic resources when owned by the
government. 12 3 A plaintiff can establish "pollution, impairment or destruction" of natural resources either by showing the conduct at issue
will violate an environmental standard or permit or by showing that
the conduct at issue "materially adversely affects or is likely to materi24
ally adversely affect the environment."
Minnesota courts have interpreted MERA very expansively,
broadly granting citizens standing to challenge state, local, and private
actions, and concluding that the "natural resources" protected under
the law include birds and the trees they nest in, 125 historic buildings,126 marsh and wildlife areas, 127 the view from a state forest and

the wilderness experience in visiting the forest, 128 quietude in residential areas, 129 drinking water wells, and wetlands.'3 0 Actions that have
123 Id. § 116B.02(4).
124 See id. § 116B.02(5). The law is subject to some exceptions, namely that a
plaintiff cannot show violation of a standard solely because of the introduction of
odor into the air and no action is allowed for conduct taken pursuant to any environmental quality standard, license, stipulation agreement or permit issued by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency or the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources.
Moreover, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant has the opportunity to present an affirmative defense that there is no feasible or prudent alternative
to the action. Economic considerations alone are not a defense. See id. § 116B.02(5);

§

116B.03-.04.

125 Wacouta, 510 N.W.2d at 30 (finding bald eagles and trees in which they roost
are "natural resources" under MERA).
126 State ex rel. Archabal v. County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 421-26 (Minn.
1993) (finding MERA action available to enjoin county from demolishing historic
armory building to build a jail); State ex rel. Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84,
87-89 (Minn. 1979) (holding that row houses were historical resources protected by
MERA and defendant did not sustain burden of proving no feasible and prudent
alternative to demolition).
127 County of Freeborn ex rel. Tuveson v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn.
1973) (holding that marsh area is a "natural resource" within the statute, plaintiff met
prima facie case of showing pollution, impairment and destruction, and remanding
case so that state could present affirmative defense of no feasible and prudent
alternative).
128 State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 896-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(affirming district court order temporarily enjoining construction of private radio
tower on private land that abutted state forest based on allegations that the tower
would spoil the view and the wilderness experience in the park and would pose a risk
for birds).
129 Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen's Club, 624 N.W.2d 796, 806
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that quietude was a natural resource under MERA
and evidence was sufficient to show gun club violated MERA).
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been enjoined under the law include a gravel pit,13 1 a shooting
13 4
range, 3 2 tree harvesting, 133 a private radio tower on private land,
135
and condemnations for highway and jail projects.
The law's most significant impact on protection of natural resources and the environment can be seen in the automatic standing
given to all persons and the fact that the law can protect natural resources where existing state statutory or regulatory law is silent or state
regulators decline to take action. 13 6 For instance, in a case involving a
shooting range that was disturbing residential neighbors, the court
found a MERA violation for impairment of "quietude" and enjoined
the range's operation despite the fact that there were no local or state
noise standards in place. 13 7 Indeed, state statutory law prohibited
state agencies from even enacting such standards. 38
By contrast, Michigan courts have been less generous on standing
issues in interpreting the Michigan Environmental Policy Act
(MEPA) 13 9 than have Minnesota courts in interpreting the Minnesota
law. As noted above, Michigan enacted MEPA as the first environmental rights statute in 1970 after Sax worked with state citizen organizations and the state legislature to help draft the law. MEPA
subsequently served as a model for other states.' 40 Like the Minnesota
law, Michigan courts have interpreted MEPA to provide for declara130 State ex rel. Shakopee Mdwakanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, Case No.
C-01-05286 (Scott County Dist. Ct., Nov. 22, 2002) (finding proposed gravel pit would
interfere with tribe's drinking water well and a DNR-protected wetland and enjoining
gravel pit in the absence of significant modifications).
131 Id.
132 Citizensfor a Safe Grant, 624 N.W.2d at 806.
133 State ex rel. Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 29-31
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
134 State ex re. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 896-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
135 State ex rel. Archabal v. Hennepin County, 495 N.W.2d 416, 421-26 (Minn.
1993) (condemnation for jail); County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290,
297-98 (Minn. 1973) (condemnation for highway).
136 See, e.g., Citizens for a Safe Grant, 624 N.W.2d at 806 (rejecting argument that
MERA is invalid without the existence of state or local noise standards); State ex rel.
Shakopee Mdwakanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, Case No. C-01-05286 (Scott
County Dist. Ct., Nov. 22, 2002) (finding evidence to support MERA claim to protect
wetland even though DNR had taken no action against gravel pit and did not testify at
the trial).
137 Citizens for a Safe Grant, 624 N.W.2d at 806.
138 Id.
139 MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 324.1701-.1706 (West 1999).
140 See Susan George et al., The Public in Action: Using State Citizen Suit Statutes to
Protect Biodiversity, 6 U. BALT. J. ENV-L. L. 1, 14-20 & app. A (1997) (summarizing
citizen suit laws).
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tory and injunctive relief to prevent harm to natural resources even
where the action at issue does not violate a statute or regulation.1 4' As
a result, MEPA empowers the judiciary to create a common law of
environmental quality that goes beyond existing state statutes or regulatory requirements in a manner similar to that developed under the
42
common law of nuisance or other torts.'
Also similar to the Minnesota law, courts have interpreted the
scope of the Michigan law quite broadly to apply to toxic substances
control, sand dune mining, wetlands protection, park management
and leasing of Great Lakes bottomlands.' 43 As in Minnesota, the
Michigan legislature created broad coverage for the law, allowing for
action to protect "the air, water, and other natural resources and the
public trust in those resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction." 14 4 Thus, as Sax envisioned, the law gives the judicial
branch the authority as a matter of common law to prevent the impairment of natural resources where the government cannot or will
45
not act pursuant to state or local legislative policy.'
However, Michigan courts have been fairly restrictive on the issue
of citizen standing to enforce the law. Like the Minnesota law, MEPA
contains a broad citizen suit provision which states that "any person
may maintain an action . . . for the protection of the air, water, and
other natural resources and the public trust in those resources from
pollution, impairment, or destruction.' ' 46 Notwithstanding this language, in a 2004 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
MEPA could not confer standing on citizens that was any broader
than allowed under the state constitution's separation of powers doc141 See, e.g., Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Mich.
1975).
142 See id.
143 See George et al., supra note 140, at 17; Jeffrey K. Haynes, Michigan's Environmental ProtectionAct in its Sixth Year: Substantive EnvironmentalLaw from Citizen Suits, 53
J. URB. L. 589, 594 (1976),

§

144

MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

145

See, e.g., Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nesfl6 Waters N. Am., Inc.,

324.1701(1).

709 N.W.2d 174, 211-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that MEPA provides for de
novo review for "'judicial development of a common law of environmental quality'")
(quoting Ray, 224 N.W.2d at 888); see aLsoJoseph L. Sax & Roger L. Conner, Michigan's EnvironmentalProtectionAct of 1970: A ProgressReport, 70 MicH. L. Rrv. 1003, 1005
(1972) (noting that the significance of MEPA is that it "reduced the broad discretion"

of regulatory agencies and now those agencies must be prepared to defend themselves "against charges that their decisions fail to protect natural resources from pollu-

tion, impairment, or destruction").
146

MicH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 324.1701(1) (West 1999) (emphasis added).
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trine.' 4 7 More recently, in a 2005 decision, the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that standing doctrine limited the ability of a water conservation organization and plaintiffs residing along a stream and lake
to sue under MEPA to prevent water pumping that would allegedly
adversely impact a lake and wetlands. 148 In reaching its decision, the
court of appeals relied on the state supreme court precedent and held
that in order to bring suit under MEPA, the plaintiffs needed to show
that they actually used the areas in question to meet constitutional
standing requirements.1 49 The court of appeals then concluded that
with regard to certain of the physical areas at issue in the lawsuit, the
50
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the MEPA claims.1
In all, by the late 1990s only fifteen states had environmental
rights statutes on the books (as opposed to citizen suit provisions contained in state environmental laws for the purpose of enforcing those
laws), and most state environmental rights statutes are much more
limited than those in Minnesota and Michigan, allowing only for actions against the state, or only for actions to enforce violations of existing law.15 1 In addition, environmental rights lawsuits are expensive
and the few statutes that allow recovery of attorneys' fees are within
the category of laws that provide for a right of action only for violation
of existing law. 15 2 Indeed, the strength of the best of these statutes is
that the court conducts a de novo review of evidence rather than an
on-the-record review with great deference to the government agency
making the decision. However, it is just this type of de novo review
that requires discovery and expert testimony which is too expensive
147 Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Cleveland Cliffs ,Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Mich.
2004) ("When a broadening and redefinition of the 'judicial power' comes not from
the judiciary itself, but from the Legislature purporting to confer new powers upon
the judiciary, the exercise of such power is no less improper.").
148 Mich. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 211-13; see Sax & Conner, supra note 145, at 1005.
149 Mich. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 212 (stating that earlier decisions "clearly determined that the Legislature was without the authority to expand standing beyond the
limits imposed by Michigan's constitution").
150 Id. at 211 ("Because plaintiffs do not use these areas, they cannot demonstrate
that they have suffered or would suffer a concrete and particularized injury distinct
from that of the public generally."). The Michigan Supreme Court recently agreed to
review the standing portions of the decision and thus changes in standing doctrine
under MEPA may be forthcoming. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nest6h Waters N. Am., Inc., 722 N.W.2d 422 (Mich. 2006) (granting motions for leave to
file amicus briefs and directing the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue
of standing).
151

See George et al., supra note 140, at 15-16.

152

See id. at app. A.
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for most plaintiffs to contemplate. 15,3 Thus, just as was concluded earlier with regard to the common law public trust doctrine and state
constitutional provisions, state environmental rights statutes on their
own are not a complete solution to better preservation of natural resources where federal, state or local protection efforts break down.
The same is true to a lesser extent with federal and state environmental protection statutes. Although such laws and the enforcement
mechanisms that go with them form the bulk of our environmental
protection efforts today, even these powerful statutes have their limitations. For instance, some statutes do not allow private parties to obtain injunctive relief or damages, others do not allow private rights of
action at all, and there can also be significant delays in statutory authority to address controversial problems such as today's concerns
54
over greenhouse gas emissions.1
153 See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 143, at 634-35 (stating that while MEPA citizen
suits have achieved many goals, they are "not a panacea; they are not meant to supplant existing administrative regulation. The potential strength of MEPA is hampered, however, by the critical lack of public interest law firms and well-financed,
permanent environmental groups with a defined target area of environmental
degradation.")
154 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7002(a) (2000) (citizen suit provision of RCRA allowing
private parties to seek injunctive relief but not damages for action contributing to
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment for violation
of law's hazardous waste requirements); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000) (allowing citizen
suits under Clean Water Act for assessment of civil penalties or imposition of injunctive relief for violation of effluent standards or limitations but no right to seek compensatory damages); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000) (providing right of action to seek civil
penalties and injunctive relief for violation of Clean Air Act statutory provisions but
no right to seek compensatory damages); 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000) (providing for the
recovery of response costs but not for injunctive relief or compensatory damages for
releases of hazardous substances); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S.
431, 449-52 (2005) (confirming that there is no private right of action under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 but holding that FIFRA does not preempt state common law claims that do not challenge the
pesticide label). As an example of limitations on state actions, CERCLA does not
provide states with the authority to seek an injunction to force a responsible private
party to remediate a hazardous waste site even if there is an imminent threat to
human health and the environment. Instead, that authority is limited to the federal
government. As a result, a state seeking to force a cleanup must resort to the common law of nuisance to obtain injunctive relief. See New York v. Shore Realty, 759
F.2d 1032, 1049-52 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding injunctive relief under CERCLA was not
available to state but that injunction could issue against defendant under New York
public nuisance law); see also PLATR ET AL., supra note 37, at 165-75 (discussing equitable relief, compensatory damages and punitive damages available for environmental
harms under the common law); Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The
Impact of CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST
L. Ruv. 903, 905 (2004) (noting that common law claims are necessary to recover for
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protection
As a whole, however, federal and state environmental
statutes where they exist
laws coupled with state environmental rights
right but also in setting
own
their
serve an important role not only in
of natural resources, public trust
forth legislative policy on protection
use in common law or constituprinciples and the environment for
of cases where such resources are
tional development. In the majority
enforcement agencies will use
threatened, federal, state and/or local
laws to address the probfederal and state environmental protection
others have documented, governlem. However, as Sax and many
can break down because of lack of
ment regulation and enforcement
resources, or competing legal conpolitical will, time, money or other
arguments. The question then recerns such as constitutional takings
the policy directives in these laws
mains in those situations whether
common law public trust doctrine
can be used in conjunction with the
In other words, can these
and/or state constitutional provisions.
together to either support state
seemingly discrete sources of law work
when there are competing
or local action to protect the environment
citizen protection of resources in
private property principles, or allow
or opposition? The next Part
the face of governmental indifference
adopt such a mutually reinforcing
explores recent judicial efforts to
protection using public trust
approach to state natural resource
principles.
II.

OF AUTHORITY
EXPANDING THE SCOPE
RECENT JUDICIAL TRENDS:
PRINCIPLES
TO IMPLEMENT PUBLIC TRUST

on the public trust doctrine
Most of the scholarly work to date
the common law doctrine or its
focuses almost exclusively on either
or its codification into state statutes.
state constitutional manifestations
the doctrine on those topics may
Although a study of one form of
forms, there has not

one of the other
often make a brief reference to
like
what the public trust might look
been any real effort to consider
each
reinforce
three forms mutually
as a cohesive whole where all
shows, however, that while scholars
other.155 A review of the case law
courts have not. Just like lawyers,
have largely ignored this approach,
with contaminaand punitive damages associated
property damage, personal injury
of federal
inability
a discussion of the current
tion to soil and groundwater). For
environmental
modern
gas emissions and other
statutory law to address greenhouse
text.
accompanying
and
280-81
issues, see infra notes
the author focuses on environwhere
85,
note
155 One exception is Kirsch, supra
the relationbut also discusses in some detail
mental provisions in state constitutions
argue that
to
doctrine
trust
the common law public
ship between those provisions and
when
provisions
constitutional
state
to the
courts were able to give the most meaning
1174.
at
Id.
of the public trust doctrine.
they were interpreted as "evocations"
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direct authority available to
judges must frequently look beyond the
in order to build a strong
support a legal principle to related authority
this type crafting of legal opinlegal basis for a position. It is precisely
unique and important role in
ions that gives the judicial branch its
and the
of law built on constitutions, statutes,
our federalist15system
6

common law.
utilize this mutually reinforcNotably, the judicial opinions that
for environmental protection
ing approach to public trust principles
in the last ten years. One explapurposes have been issued primarily
the field of environmental law is
nation for this recent trend is that
and there is a strong body of
now, after thirty years, reaching maturity
importantly, federal and state envistate constitutional law and, more
rely on not only in implementing
ronmental statutes that courts can
statutes, but also in developing
those constitutional provisions and
as the modern common law public
public trust principles. Moreover,
the 1970s, courts can now rely on
trust doctrine has developed since
of state constitutional
that body of law to inform their interpretations
law and statutory law.
of public trust principles to
This shift in judicial treatment
adis an exciting development that
broaden the range of authority
below,
critics and, as discussed
dresses many of the concerns of the
relevance today. This is particof
level
can bring the doctrine to a new
have not had a strong public
ularly important in states that historically
provisions or statutes coditrust doctrine or do not have constitutional
Because Illinois Centralappears to
fying the doctrine in some manner.
nationwide (i.e., states can interpret
impose the public trust doctrine
states or citizens in those states can
it narrowly but not abolish it),157
156

See, e.g.,

COMMON LAW
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
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(1881) (urging courts to create
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963)
POUND, THE
ROSCOE
law);
the common
recognition" of legislation in developing
Jaren eds.,
Alfred
Mathias
&
Hamilton
174-75 (Neil
SPIRIT OF TI-E COMMON LAW
law
common
(focusing on the necessity of the
Transaction Publishers 1999) (1921)
to
just
not
is
courts
the
stating that the role of
despite the growth of statutes and
common
of
body
growing
the
legislation into
interpret statutes but to "incorporate"
HARV. L. REv.
Common Law in the United States, 50
The
Stone,
F.
Harlan
law tradition);
judgment,
and
should recognize the "social policy
4, 14 (1936) (stating that judges
the common law).
expressed in legislation" in forming
states
146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892) (holding
Illinois,
157 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v.
639
at
2,
note
supra
Lazarus,
over trust lands);
are not authorized to abdicate control
to Illidecision
the
limiting
Central
in Illinois
37
(stating that there is no language
n.
to all states");
likely assumed its decision applied
"most
majority
the
and
law
nois
Central were
Illinois
in
(stating that the parties
Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 453-55
the opinion
that
and
law,
not just Illinois
arguing principles of general applicability,
applied to all
that
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a
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conceived
leaves "little doubt that the Court

2oo6l

MODERN

PUBLIC TRUST

PRINCIPLES

use the public trust doctrine where appropriate and rely on general
state or federal environmental statutes to provide standards for
development.
Certainly, one might argue that the Erie doctrine'5 s implicitly
overruled Illinois Central's efforts to mandate the public trust doctrine
nationwide because the Court did not expressly ground the doctrine
in any particular constitutional provision or federal statute. However,
in its most recent consideration of the public trust doctrine in 1988,159
the Court did not question the vitality of the doctrine, simply stating
that the scope of the doctrine was a matter of state law. 160 Moreover,
even if the doctrine is now wholly a matter of state law, no state has
taken steps to abolish it and at least one state court has invalidated
legislative efforts to abolish it.l 6 1 Indeed, all of the precedent supporting an expansion of the public trust doctrine consistent with the
framework set forth here is found in state law, not federal law. As a
result, even if states could refuse to recognize the doctrine entirely,
that theoretical possibility does not detract from present opportunities to give new life to the doctrine as a matter of state law in those
states that have the tools (i.e., state constitutions, statutes and policy
directives) and are inclined to move in that direction.
The recent cases that provide examples of this new public trust
framework tend to fall into two general categories. The first category
is where courts rely on a combination of the public trust doctrine,
state constitutional provisions, or state environmental statutes to invalidate state action (whether administrative or legislative) that may
place state public resources in jeopardy. The second category is
states"). Although the decision imposes the public trust obligation on all states, the
decision is less than clear on the source of that obligation. See Lazarus, supra note 2,

at 639-40 (stating some language in the opinion suggests the Court was announcing a
rule based on federal law, that the tone of the opinion "nearly strikes constitutional
chords" but subsequent Supreme Court decisions imply that the case rested on state
law (citing Appelby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926)); Wilkinson, supra
note 11, at 453-57 (noting that the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated the
source of law that mandates the public trust obligation in the states but raising the
possibility that it may be based on federal preemption through Congress's authority
over navigable watercourses in the Commerce Clause); see also supra notes 25-30 and
accompanying text.

158

See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (rejecting the idea of

a federal common law outside specialized contexts); I

LAURENCE
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LAw 470-72 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the scope and impact of Erie).
159 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
160 Id. at 482-85; see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
161 See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999)
(holding as a matter of state constitutional law that a state cannot abrogate the public
trust doctrine by statute).
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of the public trust doctrine, state
where courts rely on a combination
environmental statutes to uphold
constitutional provisions, and state
development of private property
governmental actions that prevent
action constitutes a taking. These
without finding such government
entities refusing to grant a develcases usually involve governmental
to protect natural resources
opment permit or enacting a regulation
and
property in question is subject to
on the grounds that the private
trust principles.
thus inherently limited by public
cases show the courts looking
The decisions in both categories of
and the preservation of resources
at the idea of the public trust
of authority to create support for
broadly, and using various strands
these decisions are primarily in
protection of such resources. Notably,
coma history of recognizing a "strong"
have
not
do
that
jurisdictions
as exists in California, New Jersey
mon law public trust doctrine (such
the common law public trust docor Wisconsin), and thus shows how
with other authority when common
trine can be used in conjunction
lacking.
law authority on its own may be
A.

to Prevent State Action
judicial Use of Public Trust Principles

examples of courts invoking a
The cases that follow are all recent
to protection of natural resources
combination of authority related
where the state is alleged to be reand the environment in situations
resources or the public's interest in
linquishing or compromising the
courts look to some combination
those resources. In all these cases,
law, and/or statutory environof common law, state constitutional
action.
mental law to invalidate the state
Supreme Court considered
Hawaii
For instance, in 2004, the
instream use was protected by the
whether a reservation of water for
conwater commission sufficiently
1 62 The
public trust, and whether the state
permit.
in granting a water
sidered public trust principles
to take those principles into
court held that the commission failed
reservation of water constitutes a
account, expressly holding that "a
the state's continuing trust obliga163
public trust purpose with respect to
and future generations.
present
for
resources
tion" to ensure water
looked to the common law public
In reaching this decision, the court
and the statutory water code as
trust doctrine, the state constitution,
held that failure to protect such
support for its decision. The court
the public trust doctrine, which
water reservations "would undermine
the relevant policy declarations
is a state constitutional doctrine, and
162
163

664 (Haw. 2004).
In reWai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d
Id. at 694.
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164 Thus, the court broadened its base of auset forth in the Code."
within the state in order to
thority with regard to natural resources
such resources.
provide the maximum protection for
Environmental Control
Similarly, in Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana
Court held that a state agency
16 5
Commission, the Louisiana Supreme
of a hazardous waste disdecision allowing construction and operation constitutional law and
law,
posal facility was contrary to state statutory
remanded the case to the agency
the public trust doctrine. The court
and statutory requireto reconsider the relevant constitutional expressly addressed the
the court
ments. 166 In its remand order,
[si tatutory and r] egulatory
"[iinterrelationship of (clonstitutional,
the state constitution's environmen[rlequirements" beginning with
obligations on state agencies
tal provision enacted in 1974, placing
various state envi67
The court then went on to consider
and officials.'
of environmental protection.
ronmental statutes setting forth a policy
requirements but "very imThese policies set out not only substantive
to ensure agencies exercise
portant procedural provisions" designed
68 The court concluded this disappropriate discretion in all cases.'
framework was based not
cussion by stating that the state regulatory
related to environmental
only on the state constitutional provisions
and referred to Sax's
doctrine,"
protection, but also the "public trust
vision of
commentators setting forth an expansive
article and other
169
the doctrine.
170 the Alaska Supreme Court
Likewise, in 1996, in Pullen v. ULmer,
to give salmon harvest preference
addressed whether a ballot initiative
sport fisheries was valid. The court
to subsistence, personal use and
appropriation of state
held that the initiative was an unconstitutional VIII, section 2 of the
to article
17
resources. ' First, the court looked
wildlife, and waters to the peofish,
Alaska Constitution which reserves
72 The court then turned to the common law,
ple for common use.'
provision was intended to codnoting that the relevant constitutional
over management of fish, wildlife
ify "historic common law principles"

164

Id.

165 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
166 Id. at 1153.
167 Id. at 1156.
168 Id. at 1157.
169 Id. at 1158.
170 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996).
171 Id. at 60-65.
172 Id. at 60.
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and water resources, and impose a trust on those resources. 73 Interestingly, this case highlights the conflict that can occur between the
public trust doctrine as a protector of public access rights and the
public trust doctrine as a protector of the resource. Arguably, the
court's decision limited the state's ability to preserve fishing resources
from overuse, thus favoring the doctrine's traditional purpose of preserving public access to resources over its more modern purpose of
preserving the resource itself.
Finally, two cases from Arizona illustrate the state judiciary relying on the public trust doctrine to prevent the state legislature from
interfering with public trust resources. In the first case, Arizona Center
for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell,1 74 the Arizona Court of Appeals
addressed whether legislation substantially relinquishing the state's interests in riverbed lands violated the public trust doctrine. The court
cited first to Illinois Central in support of the doctrine, 75 then to various statutory and constitutional provisions in other states for the proposition that states are required to hold such lands in trust for the
public.1 76 The court then looked to Arizona precedent, recognized
that the doctrine had not yet been applied in Arizona, but stated that
in order to resolve the case "we need not weave ajurisprudence out of
air."1 77 The court relied not only on Illinois Central,Sax's article, and
authority from other states, but also on the state's "constitutional commitment to the checks and balances of a government of divided powers."1 7 Thus, the court stated it would scrutinize closely any state
action that might violate the public trust doctrine and, applying such
scrutiny, found the legislation violated the state's public trust principles. 179 Here, the court had very little in the way of state common law
authority to rely upon, but reached a decision based on its own consti173 Id. A few years later, in Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999), the
Alaska Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the concept of a state public trust over
resources and rejected the argument that a public trust over resources must follow
private trust principles. The court explained that private trusts generally require the
trustee to maximize economic yield from the trust property, but the state constitution
"requires that natural resources be managed for the benefit of all people under the
assumption that both development and preservation may be necessary to provide for
future generations, and that income generation is not the sole purpose of the trust
relationship." Id. at 1032.
174 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
175 Id. at 166-67.
176 Id. at 167 n.13.
177 Id. at 168.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 169-73.
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as well as statutory, constitututional separation of powers principles
other jurisdictions.
tional, and common law precedent in
Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior
In the second Arizona case, San
8 0°
Supreme Court in 1999 reviewed
Court ex rel. Maricopa, the Arizona
stated that "[tihe public trust is
a state statute enacted in 1995 which
in adjudicating water rights,
not an element of a water right" and that
as to whether public trust
18 1
"the court shall not make a determination
the river system or source."
of
all
or
any
with
values are associated
the provision, stating that the
The state supreme court invalidated
legisa constitutional limitation on
82
public trust doctrine in Arizona is
The
held in trust for the public.
lative power to give away resources
the courts to decide whether the
court went on to state that it was "for
and that the legislature cannot
public trust is applicable to the facts"
limitations on its authority.181
by statute destroy the constitutional
common law, state constituThese cases all show courts utilizing
a critical review of state action
tional law, and state statutes to support
with public trust principles. As
that has the potential to interfere
cases is quite different from that
such, the analysis contained in these
the 1970s, such as Just v. Marinette
found in the opinions issued in
18 5 In those cases, the courts had little
County' 4 and Marks v. Whitney.
other than a vague idea of public
to draw upon at a doctrinal level
courts can and should play a role in
trust principles and belief that.8 the
6

natural resources protection
recent cases shows that courts
By contrast, a review of the more
of the
the environmental movement
have more to work with since
constitutional provisions and stat1970s, which brought with it state
with regard to protection of
utes containing strong policy statements 1 8 7
As a result, these innatural resources for future generations.
and policy statements provide substancreased statements of authority
to
and at least a partial response
tive content to public trust principles
review of legislative action. Inthose who would criticize close judicial
much
that "public trust law is not so
deed, Sax himself acknowledged
mend
to
as it is a technique for courts
a substantive set of standards"
180
181

182
183
184
185
186
187

972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999).
ANN. § 45-263(B) (2003)).
Id. at 199 (citing ARiz. REV. SrAT.
Id.
Id.
201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
768-69.
Id. at 378-79; Just, 201 N.W.2d at
See supra Part I.A.
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"perceived

imperfections" in the legislative and

administrative

18

process.1

courts are amassing from
The need for the increased authority
where the state is attempting to
various sources is just as great in cases
of private property claims. As
protect natural resources in the face
category of cases use techniques
shown below, courts in this second
and
category, resulting in a stronger
similar to the cases in the first
resources
to protect natural
more comprehensive legal foundation
and the environment.
to Defend
B. Judicial Use of Public Trust Principles
GovernmentalAction

State or Local

invoking a combination of auThe cases that follow show courts
resources and the environment
thority related to protection of natural
those resources in the face of comto support state actions to protect
doing so, courts are utilizing public
peting private property claims. In
problems without being limited by
trust principles to address modern
principles are found. Thus, courts
the various forms in which these
but infusing it with policies
are relying on the common law doctrine
contemporary environmental legisand standards contained in more
As shown below, courts have
lation or state constitutional provisions.
methods to reject attempts to invaliused these mutually-reinforcing
protection efforts and also to reject
date government environmental
takings claims.
of Government Action
Public Trust Principles in Support
drawn upon multiple sources
In several recent cases, courts have
governmental efforts to protect
of public trust principles to support
For instance, in 2005, the Lounatural resources or the environment.
the Save Ourselves decision discussed
isiana Court of Appeals relied on
decision to lower lake levels to
above'8 9 to hold that a state agency
the lake's ecology was supported
reduce organic matter and improve
90 In response to allegations that the proby the public trust doctrine.'
property rights by adversely imposed action would interfere with
court found that the state's action
pacting commercial marinas, the
in
trust doctrine and its manifestation
was consistent with the public
9
court recognized that "[e]nvironthe state's constitution.' 1 The

1.

521.
188 See Sax, supra note 5, at 509,
text.
accompanying
and
165-69
notes
189 See supra
2d 821,
&
Wildlife Fisheries Comm'n, 895 So.
190 Lake Bistineau Pres. Soc'y, Inc. v.
544 U.S. 1044 (2005).
827 (La. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied,
191 Id.
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mental amenities will often be in conflict with economic and social
considerations,"192 but that under the public trust doctrine, the
93
agency has an obligation to protect the state's environment.
In 2000, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed a challenge to a
decision by the State Commission on Water Resource Management to
amend instream flow standards. 194 As part of its proceedings, the
Commission relied in part on its responsibility under the public trust
doctrine and applied the doctrine to both surface and groundwater
resources. In reviewing the Commission's various standards, the court
provided a detailed history of the public trust doctrine and its application in the state. 195 The court then turned to the state water code and
rejected arguments that the code displaced or abrogated public trust
principles. 19 6 Rather, instead of abolishing the common law public
trust doctrine, "the legislature appears to have engrafted the doctrine
wholesale into the Code."1 9 7 Finally, the court turned to its own constitution and held that the people of the state had "elevated the public
trust doctrine to the level of a constitutional mandate." Thus, the
court found that the doctrine was a "fundamental principle" of constitutional law in the state.1 98 Moreover, the court held that mere compliance by agencies under the water code is not sufficient to
determine whether their actions comport with the public trust doctrine. 99 Instead, "the doctrine continues to inform the Code's interpretation, define its permissible 'outer limits' and justify its
existence ."200

With regard to the scope and purpose of the trust (embodied in
common law, statutory and constitutional form), the court relied on
holdings in California and other states that the purposes and uses of
the trust "have evolved with changing public values and needs." 20'
Thus, "the state has both [an] authority and duty to preserve the
rights of present and future generations in the waters of the state,"
192 Id. at 826.
193 Id. at 827; see also Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1101-02 (La. 2004) (holding state coastal restoration project that interfered with private oyster leases was not
an unconstitutional taking because state was obligated to protect its coastline resources for present and future generations under the state constitution and the public trust doctrine).
194 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 425-30 (Haw. 2000).
195 Id. at 439-42.
196 Id. at 442-45.
197 Id. at 442.
198 Id. at 444.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 443-45.
201 Id. at 448 (discussing public trust decisions from California and New jersey).
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when allocating water reand must take its duty into account
trust principles applied equally
sources. 20 2 The court held that these
stating that "[m]odern scito both surface water and groundwater,
the surface-ground dichotence and technology have discredited
that in determining the scope
omy." 2 03 The court went on to reason
little sense in adhering to artificial
of public trust resources, "we see
the ancient system nor borne out in
distinctions neither recognized bythis state." 20 4
of
the present practical realities
on all forms of public trust
Another example of a court relying
Court
action is the North Carolina
20 5 In that
principles to support government
County.
v. New Hanover
of Appeals' 2005 decision in Parker
assessment for an inlet relocaspecial
a
case, a landowner challenged
and damage. In holding the
tion project to address coastal erosion
the court relied on the state's
assessment was not unconstitutional,
authority to protect natural
common law, statutory, and constitutional
ap2 06 The court stated first that the public trust doctrine
resources.
2 7 It then shifted focus to the
at issue.
plied to the waters and lands
setting forth a policy that the state:
provision
state's constitutional
for the benefit of all its
conserve and protect its lands and waters
recreational, and scenic areas, to
citizenry . . . and preserve park,
air and water, to control excontrol and limit the pollution of our
way to preserve as a
cessive noise, and in every other appropriateforests, wetlands, estuaState its
20 8
part of the common heritage of this
and places of beauty.
openlands,
sites,
historical
ries, beaches,
with those in the state's
The court found these policies consistent
the value of North CaroCoastal Area Management Act, emphasizing which are "[a] mong the
its estuaries
lina's coastal resources, including
of this State and of this namost biologically productive regions
levy
the county had authority2 1to
0 The
tion."2 09 Thus, the court found that
purposes.
other preservation
the assessments for erosion and
stating that its constitution, the
court concluded this discussion by
all support taking "proactive
public trust doctrine and state statutes
and other storms," and that
steps to protect property from hurricanes
had been "brought home particuthe importance of these activities
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

209
210

Id. at 453.
Id. at 447.
Id.
619 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 874-76.
Id. at 875.

§ 5) (emphasis omitted).
Id. (citing N.C. CoNsr. art. XIV,
(2003)).
113A-102(a)
§
Id. (citing N.C. GEN. S-rAT.

Id. at 875-76.
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larly keenly by recent hurricanes and their devastating impact along
21 1
the Gulf Coast of the United States."
Likewise, the Washington Supreme Court in 1998 upheld a
county ordinance banning personal watercraft use on all marine waters and one lake in the county based on both the public trust doctrine as well as "the goals of statewide environmental protection
statutes."2 12 Although the plaintiffs argued that the ban interfered
with the public's ability to use the waters and thus violated the public
trust doctrine, the court held that "it would be an odd use of the public trust doctrine to sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and wildlife of this state."2 3 As a result, the court was
able to rely on statewide environmental statutory policy to use the
public trust doctrine to protect natural resources, even if it conflicted
with public access rights that were historically protected under the
doctrine.
Similarly the Virginia Court of Appeals held in 2006 that the
state's marine resources commission was justified in denying a permit
to construct a storage shed on a pier located along a creek based on
public trust principles.2 1 4 In reaching its decision, the court cited the
applicable state law, which directed the agency to consider preservation of public trust resources in reviewing applications for permits to
build structures over state owned lands. 21 5 The court cited not only
the common law doctrine as support for the agency's action, but also
the Virginia Constitution setting forth a policy to protect the state's
"atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, impairment or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment and general welfare of the peo2 16
ple of the Commonwealth."
211 Id.; see also Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 835-41 (S.D. 2004) (holding that
lakes newly created in recent years by climate change were subject to public trust
doctrine based on common law doctrine in South Dakota as well as the State's Water
Resources Act which codifies public trust principles and evinces a legislative intent to
allocate and regulate water resources).
212 Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 283-84 (Wash. 1998).
213 Id. at 284.
214 Palmer v. Commonwealth Marine Res. Comm'n, 628 S.E.2d 84, 90-91 (Va. Ct.
App. 2006).
215 Id. at 89-90.
216 Id. at 89 (citing VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1); see also Evelyn v. Commonwealth, 621
S.E.2d 130, 137 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (holding it "entirely appropriate" for the state
environmental agency and judiciary to consider the legislature's express duty to safeguard the public right of subaqueous lands held in trust for the benefit of the public
under the common law doctrine and the state constitution in "applying all legislative
enactments").
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Public Trust Principles as a Defense Against Takings Claims

Courts in many jurisdictions have relied upon public trust principles to support state environmental regulations in the face of constitutional takings claims. As students and scholars of property and land
use well know, regulatory takings is a "hot" issue these days, with several Supreme Court decisions in a short period of time and significant
commentary.2 1 7 However, the use of public trust principles as a counterbalance to takings claims for public interest purposes has a strong
history going all the way back to Illinois Central RailroadCo. v. Illinios218
and continuing up to the present. As a result there is strong precedent for courts to use public trust principles to promote protection of
natural resources without running afoul of takings claims that would
cripple environmental protection efforts.
For instance, in Illinois Central,the issue over whether Illinois had
the power to convey the land under Lake Michigan to the railroad was
really a question of whether, once the state conveyed the land, it had
to proceed by eminent domain to get it back, or whether it could simply invalidate the original conveyance. That is precisely how Justice
Shiras in his dissenting opinion saw the issue. In his opinion, Justice
Shiras reviewed the contract conveying the land to the railroad and
found that the contract conveyed the ownership of land but prevented
the railroad from impairing public rights of navigation or obstructing
the harbor in any way.21 9 As a result, Justice Shiras posited that there
was no impairment of any public trust rights until and unless the railroad attempted to infringe upon those limitations contained in the
initial grant.22 0 In the meantime, if Illinois wanted to take back the
217 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 336-37 (2002) (imposing a moratorium on development as part of land use
planning was not a per se taking); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634-35
(2001) (permitting a property owner to challenge development restrictions on waterfront property even if restrictions predate his ownership); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-30 (1992) (holding state coastal zone management act that
prevented all development of beachfront property was a taking unless background,
common law principles of property and nuisance would have prevented the development); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482
U.S. 304, 318-21 (1987) (holding that if a government regulation results in a taking,
the government must pay just compensation from the time the regulation is enacted
until it is rescinded); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VicKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 178, 184-85, 193 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing recent scholarly commentary on
regulatory takings).
218
219

146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id. at 469-73 (Shiras, J., dissenting).

220

Id. at 474.
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lands it had granted, it could do so only "by a constitutional condem22
nation of them."

1

The majority, of course, rejected this analysis, holding instead
that the public trust prevented the conveyance of land in the first
place. 2 22 On the takings issue, the Court found that the arguments on
those issues were "not parallel" to the current case. 22 3 Instead, the

Court stated simply that common law and public policy applied a different source of law when the issue was lands under navigable waters
historically held in trust for the public.224 Thus, Illinois Central itself

embraced the concept that public trust principles were historic common law limitations on the ability of private parties to develop public
trust lands.
This idea of the public trust as a background limitation on private
property rights continues through the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Just v. Marinette County225 in 1972 and California Supreme
Court decisions from the early 1900s into the 1980s. 226 In Just, the

landowners argued that government regulations restricting them
from filling the wetlands on their property required payment of just
compensation.2 2 7 In rejecting that argument, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that public trust principles not only required the state to
promote navigation but also protect and preserve waters for fishing,
recreation, and scenic beauty. 228 As a result, based on public trust

principles, a landowner has "no absolute and unlimited right to
change the essential natural character of his land" or use it for a purpose "unsuited to its natural state and which injures the rights of
229
others."
Likewise, the California Supreme Court several times expressly
rejected claims that exercise of the public trust to prevent development of private property constituted a taking of property which required just compensation. These cases arose in situations where the
state sought to improve navigation and ta!ke other actions to promote
the public trust in private tidelands, 23 0 where the state sought to limit
the development of tidelands that had been sold to private parties
221
222

Id.
Id. at 452-53.

223 Id. at 455-58.
224 Id. at 457-58.
225 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
226 See infra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
227 Just, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
228 Id. at 768.
229 Id.
230 See People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 87-88 (Cal. 1913).
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many years prior,2 3 I and where nonprofit groups challenged the continuation of prior appropriated water diversions from inland streams
that would impact natural resources in navigable waters.2 32 In the last
case, the "Mono Lake" decision discussed supra in Part I.A., the supreme court summarized its precedent in this area as being based on
Illinois Central, which "remains the primary authority even today, almost nine decades after it was decided." 233 Based on that authority,
the court confirmed that use of public trust principles did not constitute a taking of property, even where the lands had long been thought
free of any interference or restriction from the public trust.234 Thus,

Illinois Central and various state court decisions show the public trust
as a long-standing common law principle limiting private development without resulting in a constitutional taking requiring just
compensation.
More recently, historic common law doctrines such as the public
trust doctrine have played a central role in the regulatory takings debate as a result of the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council.235 In Lucas, the issue was whether the state's

beachfront management act restricting development of coastal areas
was a taking of private property. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Scalia, announced what appeared to be a new "per se" rule of regulatory takings. Under this new rule, if the government denies all economic use of property (i.e., a complete "wipe-out"), the action is a
taking of private property that must be compensated under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution unless "background principles" of state nuisance and property law would have precluded the development in question. 2 6 As a result, since 1992, courts
and scholars have grappled with which state laws constitute the sort of
"background principles" sufficient to prevent an unconstitutional taking of private property. 23 v Not surprisingly, one background principle

of property law courts have looked to is the longstanding public trust
doctrine, which predates the existence of the United States itself and

231
232
233

City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363-64 (Cal. 1980).
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
Id. at 721 (quoting City of Berkeley, 606 P.2d at 365).

234

Id. at 723-24.

235 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
236 See id. at 1028-32.
237 See, e.g.,
Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 38, at 331-54 (discussing Lucas and arguing that courts have expansively interpreted the "background principles" of nuisance
and property law which foreclose a claim for compensation under the takings clause).
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has been used as a defense to takings cases as far back as Illinois
Central.2 38
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in
2002 that a city's denial of a shoreline development permit application was not a taking based on the "background principles" of Washington law which restricted the type of development at issue. 23 9 The
court stated that the public trust doctrine had always existed in Washington, and the doctrine was also reflected in the state's Shoreline
Management Act.2

40

The court found that the Shoreline Manage-

ment Act was made necessary after a long history of sale of tidelands
and shoreland resulted in the privatization of a vast majority of these
lands, and unrestricted construction was not in the public interest. 2 4 t
Thus, because development in the tideland areas at issue would have
interfered with public trust uses, the development plans were never a
legally permissible use and the restriction of such development was
not a taking.242 Here, instead of relying on the more amorphous
common law public trust doctrine, the court used the common law
doctrine as a base but used the more specific policy directives in the
state's Shoreline Management Act to provide standards to flesh out
public trust principles.
Likewise, the New York Supreme Court in 1998 upheld the constitutionality of a state law restricting development in an area of Long
Island in large part because of the important principles of the public
trust doctrine, provisions of the New York Constitution and "the assumption that the conservation of resources is intrinsically good and
necessary for the continuance of society." 243 Finally, the Rhode Island
Superior Court in 2005, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,24 4 found that the
state's denial of a permit to fill eighteen acres of salt marsh was not a
taking, after the U.S. Supreme Court had remanded the case for a
takings analysis.2 45 The court described the tidal pond adjoining the
salt marsh as a "particularly fragile ecosystem," and the salt marsh itself as a "valuable filtering system" for runoff and pollutants, and inte238 See id. at 341-44 (discussing courts' recent use of public trust doctrine to deny
takings claims under Lucas). But see Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of
Nature: UnderstandingLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433,
1438-39 (1993) (suggesting that Lucas may be viewed as a rejection of the ecological
worldview expressed in Just v. Marinette County).
239 Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2002).
240 Id. at 985-86.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 986-87.
243 W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
244 No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005).
245 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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In rejecting the takings

claim, the lower court held the plaintiffs proposal to fill the salt
marsh would constitute a nuisance and was also limited by the state
public trust doctrine, which was incorporated into the state's constitution. 2 4 7

Indeed, the court cited prior Rhode Island case law stating

that any system of regulation of tidal land in the state must be viewed
2
in the context of the public trust doctrine.

48

These more recent cases show courts following in the tradition of
Illinois Central and Just with regard to regulatory takings cases, but using a more structured and mutually reinforcing approach to public
trust principles. In these cases, the courts are drawing on wellfounded background principles of property law in the form of the
public trust doctrine, but giving these principles new life and standards by integrating the new policies and legal standards to protect
natural resources created since the 1970s. Such an approach is not
only consistent with Illinois Central but is also consistent with Lucas's
requirement that modern day environmental protection regulations
be based on background principles of property law to avoid takings
claims in complete "wipe-out" situations.
III.

CREATING A MODERN FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT

NATURAL RESOURCES

So we see in Part II that there is a trend among at least a small
group of courts in recent years to integrate the common law public
trust doctrine, state constitutional environmental protection provisions, and state statutes to protect natural resources and the environment as a matter of state law. What does this trend mean and why is it
important? Why are we seeing more of this since the 1990s than in
prior years when environmental statutes and constitutional provisions
have been around since the 1970s? The remainder of this Article attempts to address these questions.
A.

Utilizing Public Trust Principles in Conjunction with Constitutional,
Statutory and Regulatory Policy

First, the new federal and state environmental statutes of the
1970s and 1980s brought with them the creation of expert agencies
and funding for vast numbers of studies and data collection opportunities in areas of air pollution, water pollution, toxic substances,
246
247
248
2003);

Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974, at *3.
Id. at *5-7 (citing R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17).
Id. at *7 (citing Champlin's Realty Assocs. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1165 (R.I.
Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1999)).
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techniques. Richard Revesz has
remediation and pollution control
has resulted in a marked
documented how this growth in expertise
of state and local environincrease in the competence and experience
statutory and reguwho establish and implement state
mental officials
249
latory policy.
standards and policies cannot
There is no reason these statutory
state public trust principles and the
be used to inform development of
courts doing so. This trend goes
decisions cited in earlier Parts show
and has permeated related arwell beyond public trust developments
for environmental harm. For
eas such as tort claims seeking relief
and state environmental statinstance, since the explosion of federal
have used a growing number of
utes beginning in the 1970s, courts
to develop their state common law
statutory and regulatory standards
and injunctive relief in cases
of tort on issues of liability, damages,
These judicial techniques find supinvolving environmental harm.
the Restatement (Third) of Torts
port in the proposed final draft of
as Negligence Per Se," which
on the topic of "Statutory Violations
he or she violates a statute "designed
states that an actor is negligent if
the actor's conduct causes and
to protect against the type of accident
persons the statute is designed to
if the victim is within the class of
these requirements she may re0
protect. '25 Thus, if a plaintiff meets
for violation of a federal, state
cover damages or obtain an injunction
25 1 under the doctrine of negligence per
252
or local statute or ordinance
of action.
right
private
a
provide
not
se even if the statute itself does
for nuisance, often cited as the
These same principles apply to claims
law, which also can be based
foundation for modern environmental
25 3
violations.
on statutory or regulatory

249 Revesz, supra note 111, at 626-30.
14 (Proposed
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §
250 RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS:
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
adopted
the section applies equally to "regulations
stat251 See id. cmt. a (stating that
federal
and
adopted by local councils,
by state administrative bodies, ordinances
agencies").
by federal administrative
utes as well as regulations promulgated
252 Id. cmt. b.
(3d ed.
THE LAW OF PROPERTY 415
253 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN,
nuisance); see also
statute is one way to establish a
2000) (noting that violation of a
in a section entitied
TORTS § 874A cmt. e (1979) (stating,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
law, violations
common
Provision," that at
"Tort Liability for Violation of Legislative
se and nuiper
negligence
both
used to establish
of statutes and regulations can be
an "unreasonnuisance" is any activity that involves
sance). At common law, a "public
Conduct is
821B.
§
to the general public." Id.
able interference with a right common
health,
public
with
it involves a significant interference
by
deemed "unreasonable" if (1)
prohibited
is
it
(2)
or
or public convenience,
or
safety, public peace, public comfort
nature
regulation, or (3) it is of a continuing
statute, ordinance or administration
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to develop the common law
Courts have used statutory standards
for negligence and nuisance. In-

in areas beyond establishing liability
policies and standards in
deed, courts have regularly used statutory
law in environmental cases
recent years to inform the common
of common law strict liability for
through expansive interpretations
254 and the growing concept of "stigma damages"
2 55 Both of
environmental harm
common law tort claims.
under
property
contaminated
for
the enactment in 1980 of the Comthese developments can be tied to
Compensation and Liability Act
prehensive Environmental Response,
and the

how the government
(CERCIA),256 which revolutionized
2 5 7 The same analysis can be
contaminated property.

public deal with
which can and should evolve with
applied to public trust principles,
stanthat supply necessary
25 8
statutory and constitutional developments
issues.
resources
natural
today's
dards and policies to address
trust doctrine in many states is
Certainly the common law public
doctrines of negligence, nuisance,
narrower in scope than general
a doctrine that has developed
and strict liability. However, it remains
like other common law doctrines,
with changing societal needs, and,
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A Contemporary Response to the Critics

Viewing public trust principles in this more holistic and mutuallyreinforcing manner addresses many of the criticisms lodged against
the doctrine. First, scholars have criticized the doctrine for relying on
a property-based paradigm of natural resources protection that has
foreclosed a more ecological or holistic vision of our relationship with
the environment. 26 2 These critics argue that the nation was poised to
rethink the importance of private property rights in a radical and pro263
gressive way, rendering the public trust doctrine an anachronism.
However, as is shown in the judicial decisions described in the
prior Parts of this Article, when courts rely on broad state constitutional environmental provisions or policy statements in environmental
protection statutes in discussing public trust principles, the rhetoric
conveys a strong sense of the need for an ecology-based approach to
resource protection, and often recognizes the close relationship between humans and their environment.2 64 Moreover, while a revolution in favor of ecological protection over property rights may have
seemed to be a potential trend in the 1980s or early 1990s when these
arguments were made, the trend appears to be much the opposite
now. One manifestation of this reversal can be seen in the Supreme
Court's 1992 decision in Lucas, 2 65 which Sax saw as a rejection of an

"ecological worldview" challenge to private property rights.2 66 Inexercise their common law powers over statutes by revising statutes where appropriate
or forcing legislatures to act, rather than being limited to interpreting existing statutory language or invalidating statutes based on constitutional grounds); WILLIAM N.
ESKRuDCE, JR. ET AL.,

CASES

AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION

570-92 (3d ed. 2001)

(presenting Moragne and the Landis and Calabresi proposals in the context of discussing statutes as a source of policy norms); Klass, supra note 255 (manuscript at 17-28)
(tracing the theoretical basis for developing environmental common law against the
backdrop of existing federal and state environmental statutes).
262 See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 1, at 1213-18.
263 See id. at 1214 (stating that one problem with the public trust approach "is that
the model is inherently antagonistic to the promotion of innovative environmental
thought"); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 633 (stating that the trends in the late 1970s and
early 1980s have eroded traditional concepts of private property rights in natural resources and the public trust doctrine has obscured analysis and has made more difficult the process of reworking natural resources law in light of these trends).
264 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d
1085, 1101-02 (La. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1049 (2005); W.J.F. Realty Corp. v.
State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1011-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (Wis. 1972); supra Part I.A.
265 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
266 See Sax, supra note 238, at 1439 ("The Court correctly perceives that an ecological worldview presents a fundamental challenge to established property ights, but
the Court incorrectly rejects the challenge.").
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public interest and more protection of private property rights. 2

72

The

Oregon Supreme Court recently held that Measure 37 was constitutional, 2 73 and voters considered similar ballot initiatives in 2006 in Arizona, California, Idaho, and Washington.2 7 4 These trends do not
mean that environmentalists should despair of ever reaching a point
in this country where there would be a real revolution in conceptions
of humanity's relationship with the environment. That day may still
come. But it may not come soon, and in the interim, public trust
principles allow the courts to participate appropriately in the law of
natural resources protection particularly during times where legislative efforts are not a driving force in this area.
Another criticism of the common law public trust doctrine, expressed most forcefully by Richard Lazarus, is that it draws attention
away from the enactment of strong environmental legislation, which is
a more comprehensive and democratic method of protecting natural
resources. 2 75 However, the thesis set forth in this Article is that common law public trust principles and strong environmental legislation
are not an "either-or" proposition. With the approach set out here,
strong environmental legislation is crucial to providing policy direction and standards to the development of new public trust principles.
In this way, the public trust doctrine can provide the vehicle for state
judicial review in cases where the statute does not provide its own
2 76
right of action.
272

See State of Or., Voter's Pamphlet 103-04 (2004), available at http://www.sos.

state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/pdf/vpvoll.pdf; Symposium, Ballot Measure
37: The Redrafting of Oregon's Landscape, 36 ENVTL. L. 1 (2006) (discussing ramifications of Measure 37); Editorial, The Anti-Kelo Case, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at A16
(reporting on Measure 37 and expressing hope that laws like Measure 37 and legislative responses to the Kelo decision "may well inspire more Americans to continue
defending that most basic of Constitutional rights: owning property").
273 See MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 311-12 (Or. 2006)
(upholding the constitutionality of Measure 37).
274 See, e.g., Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, Property Rights Issues on the 2006
Ballot, www.ncsl.org/statevote/prop-rights-06.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) (initiative passed in Arizona and failed in remaining states); Am. Planning Ass'n, Eminent
Domain Legislation Across America, http://www.planning.org/legislation/measure
37/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
275 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 712-13.
276 For instance, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
7 U.S.C.A. §§ 13 6 -1 3 6y (2000 & West Supp. 2006), does not allow private parties to
sue for violation of statutory provisions, leaving plaintiffs to resort to common law
claims for injunctive relief or damages. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544
U.S. 431, 448 (2005) (indicating that FIFRA does not provide a federal remedy for
persons injured as a result of a manufacturer's violation of FIFRA's labeling require-

2006]

MODERN

PUBLIC TRUST

PRINCIPLES

trust doctrine had
Moreover, it does not appear that the public
of federal and state statuany detrimental impact on the development
law in earlier years. Congress and
tory environmental and regulatory
and regulatory framework that
the states created the massive statutory
protection at precisely the same
27 7
currently exists for environmental
was also on the rise.
trust doctrine
time that the modern public

of the common law public
Indeed, if anything, Sax's revitalization
impact on the shaping of fedtrust doctrine had an extremely positive
emphasis on citizen suit provieral environmental law through the
of endangered species and other
sions and the focus on protection
public and future
resources for the benefit of the
environmental
2 78
generations.
state common law has
Despite these early potential synergies,
scholars and students of environbeen little more than a sideline for
federal environmental regulatory
mental law since the creation of the
where there is
2 79 However, today we find ourselves in an era
system.
the failure of the federal executive
significant public concern over
action on today's environmenand legislative branches to take strong
emissions, global warmtal challenges, whether they are automobile
280 Much of this
of toxic substances.
ing, water pollution, or regulation
(2d Cir. 2003)
of New York, 351 F.3d 602, 605
ments); No Spray Coal., Inc. v. City
right of action in FIFRA).
(discussing the absence of a private
of signifi109, at 88-90 (providing chronology
note
supra
277 See PERCIVAL ET AL.,
cant federal environmental legislation).
trust connote 37, at 1066 (noting that "public
278 See, e.g., PLATER ET AL., supra
significant
of
of endangered species, prevention
cepts can be found in the protection
restoration of
cleaner than necessary for health,
far
quality
deterioration (PSD) in air
purity even
groundwater
for
values, safeguards
mined lands despite low locational
note 9,
supra
resource, and so on"); see also SAx,
where no one uses the groundwater
among
will,
right
public
of public trust as a
at 173-74 (stating that implementation
environment,
the
harm
might
of alternatives that
other things, force consideration
of environand help create "an effective body
rights
public
of
recognize legitimacy
ment law").
law in
note 109, at 103 (noting that common
279 See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra
more
the
but
purposes
for compensation
the environmental area remains important
regulation);
state
of
product
the
are
measures
innovative environmental protection
are
that private nuisance actions alone
agreement"
"wide
is
there
(stating
75
id. at
37,
note
supra
AL.,
problems); PLATER ET
insufficient to resolve more typical pollution
environmental
addressing
in
law
of common
at 283-84 (citing various limitations
problems).
Mining,
Takes on the White House on Mountaintop
280 See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Judge
mining
of
ability
the
over
(discussing a lawsuit
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2002, § 1, at 18
and derock
mountaintop
blasting
mining,"
companies to engage in "mountaintop
to allow
Bush administration's rule change
the
and
streams,
nearby
into
positing it
Battle
Won
Lobby
Power
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., How
adsuch practices); Christopher Drew &
Bush
the
(discussing
Al
at
Mar. 6, 2004,
of Pollution Control at E.P.A., N.Y. TIMEs,

NOTR E DAME

750

..

AEA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82:2

EE..8

who have taken
concern is expressed by state and local governments see as a "void"
they
fill what
matters into their own hands to attempt to
inadequate enforcement of
and
left by inadequate federal regulations
.2s l State efforts to rely on state common law to fill
existing regulations
of global warming, where some
this void are most obvious in the area
claims to address greenstates are looking to common law nuisance
federal government's refusal to
house gas emissions in the face of the
in 2006, North Carolina
regulate strongly in this area. For instance,
claiming greenAuthority
filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley
authority
power
by the federal
house gas emissions from plants owned
state's
the
and
Carolina citizens
in several states were harming North
during
Act lawsuits against power plants initiated
ministration's dismissal of Clean Air
to
E.P.A.
Jehl,
Douglas
EPA);
the
within
the Clinton administration and departures
(discussAl
2001, at

Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
Abandon New Arsenic Limits for Water
during Clinof new arsenic standards enacted
ing Bush administration's withdrawal
Course, N.Y.
Reverses
Bush
water); Editorial, Mr.
ton administration to protect drinking
to regulate
not
decision
Bush's
(criticizing President
TIMES, March 15, 2001, at A24
Richard A.
contrary);
the
to
promise
a campaign
emissions of carbon dioxide despite
TIMES,
N.Y.
Pollution,
PlanningOwn Lawsuits Over
Oppel,Jr. & Christopher Drew, States
several
of
general
attorneys
proposed lawsuits by
Nov. 9, 2003, at Al (discussing
Air Act after the
utilities for violations of the Clean
electric
sue
to
northeastern states
utilities); Kathadismissed lawsuits pursuing the
EPA dropped its investigations and
TIMES, Aug.
N.Y.
Rule on Antipollution Exemption,
rine Q. Seelye, Administration Adapts
air rules to
clean
of
administration's relaxation
28, 2003, at A20 (discussing Bush
pollution
installing
without
upgrades
to make
allow thousands of industrial plants
Coastal
over
Reach
Seeks to Limit EnvironmentalLaw's
controls); Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S.
new
administration's
at AIO (discussing the Bush
Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002,
majorvast
the
to
apply
not
does
Policy Act
position that the National Environmental
control).
States
United
under
ity of oceans
2d 265, 271-74
Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp.
281 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am.
power plants
midwestern
by several states against
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing action
law of nuicommon
federal
gas emissions under
for failure to reduce greenhouse
Law Responses to Global
State
Hodas,
R.
David
sance on "political question" grounds);
ENVTL. L. REV.
Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE
Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think
of global
issue
the
on
of federal leadership
53, 53-59 (2003) (discussing absence
and state
gases,
greenhouse
of
opposition to control
warming, federal administration
greenhouse
regulate
adopt laws and regulations to
and local policy initiatives to
Environmental Policy,
National
in
General
Attorneys
State
gases); Symposium, The Role of
Professor Thomas
by
comments
(2005) (containing
30 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 403, 404
contamination
MTBE
address
to
local governments
McGarity about actions by state or
moribund, one of
less
or
more
[
grown
have
agencies
and stating that " a]s the federal
innovative
is a small group of state AG's filing
the few progressive forces left today
genattorneys
by
lawsuits
280 (discussing proposed
suits"); Oppel & Drew, supra note
Clean Air
the
of
violations
for
utilities
to sue electric
eral of several northeastern states
the
and dismissed lawsuits pursuing
investigations
its
dropped
EPA
the
after
Act
utilities).

206

MODERN

PUBLIC

TRUST

PRINCIPLES

economy. 28 2 The suit is being brought under the source states' public
nuisance laws as there is no federal statute available to address greenhouse gas emissions. This perceived federal inaction and recent state
responses present the perfect opportunity to seriously consider the
renewed role state public trust principles can play in new environmental protection efforts.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's "new federalism" revolution in
the 1990s may call into question the ability of federal environmental
statutes to continue to be the driving force to protect the environment. 2813 The Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez28 4
and United States v. Morrison2 85 put limits on the prior limitless reach
of Congress's authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Because nearly all federal environmental statutes are enacted pursuant
to Commerce Clause authority, blind reliance on the ability of Congress to regulate nationwide to protect natural resources and the environment may not be wise. 286 As a result, public trust principles as
implemented by state courts can be developed to be part of the new
and innovative efforts states are undertaking in our federalist system
7
both as a matter of legislation and of common law. 28
282 See Complaint at 1, North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 439 F. Supp. 2d 486
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2006) (No. 1:06-CV-20); North CarolinaLawsuit Against TVA Alleges
Harmfrom Power Plant Emissions, 37 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 221 (Feb. 3, 2006).
283 See, e.g., Klass, supra note 255 (manuscript at 17-28) (discussing the impact of
.new federalism" principles on environmental law).
284 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990
on grounds that it regulated a local activity beyond Congress's reach under the Commerce Clause).
285 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act holding that it had too tenuous a relationship to interstate commerce to be within Congress's authority to regulate).
286 For examples of Commerce Clause challenges to federal environmental statutes, see United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 701-02 (4th Cir. 2003) (Clean Water
Act); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624-25 (5th Cir. 2003) (Endangered Species Act); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (Endangered Species Act); Frier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 182
(2d Cir. 2002) (CERCLA); Allied Local & Reg'l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 66
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (Clean Air Act); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 487-88 (4th Cir.
2000) (Endangered Species Act); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Endangered Species Act); United States v. Olin Corp.,
107 F.3d 1506, 1508 (11th Cir. 1997) (CERCLA); see also Rapanos v. United States,
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2216-17, 2220-27 (2006) (addressing the Clean Water Act's authority
over intrastate wetlands but deciding the case on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (same).
287 See Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water
Law: A Modem View of the Public Trust Doctrine,19 ENVTL. L. 573, 577-78 (1989) (stating
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Finally, the public trust doctrine has been subject to criticism by
those who see it as simply another unconstitutional deprivation of private property without just compensation. 28 8 In other words, if the judiciary chooses to apply public trust principles in an expansive way, it
is a taking of private property and just compensation is due. This argument is based upon the idea that there should be no difference
between state and local regulations that deprive a landowner of her
land's economic use and judicial application of the public trust doctrine that deprives a landowner of her land's economic use. 2 89
However, the idea of the public trust doctrine as a limit on private property rights is as old as the founding of the nation. This is not
some "new" land grab for environmental protection, but finds its authority starting with Illinois Central29 0 which certainly predates the current debates on regulatory takings.29 1 Moreover, the idea that there is
something fundamentally different between statutes and regulations
restricting land use on the one hand, and common law on the other
has been cemented into federal constitutional law for over ten years.
In Lucas, 292 Justice Scalia stated that the only defense to a denial of all

beneficial or economic use of land was if the regulation was merely
forbidding uses that would be prohibited by "background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance." 293 As has always been the
case, state common law principles of nuisance and property by definition expand, and the Court's decision does not expressly state that
state common law doctrines were set in stone at any particular date.
Indeed, Justice Scalia noted in determining whether common law
principles would prevent the use at issue, that "changed circumstances
or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no
longer so. ''294 As Michael Blumm and Lucus Ritchie have shown in

their recent article on the topic, courts in various jurisdictions have
that "the public trust doctrine represents a working example of federalism"); Klass,
supra note 255 (manuscript at 17-28) (summarizing various state common law and
legislative efforts to fill the federal void).
288 See, e.g., Huffman, supranote 3, at 533 (arguing that the public trust doctrine is
out of place in a constitutional democracy); James R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation
for Public Trust Takings, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 333 (1998) (stating that compensation should be provided to private property owners if their property rights are limited
by the public trust doctrine); Thompson, supra note 3, at 1450 (indicating that common law rules can result in takings in the same manner as regulatory restrictions).
289 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 3, at 1450-54.
290 111.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
291 See supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
292 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
293 Id. at 1029.
294 Id. at 1031.
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applied modern conceptions of nuisance, public trust, the natural use
doctrine, customary rights, water rights, and wildlife trusts to avoid
finding a taking consistent with Lucas.2 1 5 That these background

principles are now applied in modern ways to modern issues is simply
a function of the development of state common law and does not run
afoul of Lucas or constitutional takings jurisprudence. 29 6
In the end, state public trust principles will not and should not be
a substitute for strong legislative protection for natural resources and
the environment. Our current regulatory state surely provides far
more protection for natural resources and the environment than the
system in place prior to the 1970s. However, there are many gaps in
the system resulting from lack of enforcement, lack of political will,
lack of resources and a host of other impediments to the enactment
and enforcement of strong environmental protection laws. Public
trust principles as implemented by state courts can play a significant
role in filling those gaps, if scholars expand their view of these principles and more lawyers and judges follow the lead of the decisions discussed in Part II. In this way, those in the legal academy and the legal
profession can begin the process of creating a more comprehensive
approach to natural resources protection that relies upon the public
trust doctrine along with statutory and constitutional policies and
standards. Such an approach goes beyond the formalistic distinctions
in the law to see that all these sources of law form a cohesive whole
and, in the process, move the legal doctrine to the next level in addressing contemporary environmental and natural resource issues.
CONCLUSION

This Article proposes a new framework for using public trust principles to protect natural resources and the environment that creates a
mutually-reinforcing relationship between the common law doctrine
and environmental protection provisions contained in state statutes
and constitutions. Such a framework builds on recent developments
in the state courts that can begin to establish a cohesive jurisprudence
of natural resources protection in contrast to prior scholarship that
295 See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 38, at 341-53; see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing recent cases in which courts denied takings claims based on the modern applications of the public trust doctrine).
296 But see Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In Stevens, Justice Scalia dissented from a denial of certiorari in an Oregon case denying development rights to owners of certain dry sand beaches because
of the public's interest in those beaches and argued that "[n]o more by judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a State transform private property into public prop-

erty without compensation." Id.
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has assumed an "either-or" dichotomy between the common law and
statutes. Scholars, courts and lawyers can work toward this goal by
reaching out beyond the common law precedent of the doctrine and
incorporating policy statements and standards from the current
codifications of these principles found in state constitutions and statutes. Doing so will strengthen state public trust principles and provide protection for state natural resources in situations where other
branches of the government cannot or will not act. Moreover, this
process also has the potential to create a new dialogue in the area of
environmental law focusing on principles of ecology and interconnectedness in a way that has been difficult to achieve so far.

